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Foreword
The Reducing Burglary Initiative
In 1998 the Home Office announced the Crime Reduction Programme. The programme was
intended to develop and implement an integrated approach to reducing crime and making
communities safer. The Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI), launched in 1999, was one of the
first parts of this programme to commence.
The aims of the RBI are to:
 reduce burglary nationally by targeting areas with the worst domestic burglary
problems;
 evaluate the cost effectiveness of the different approaches; and
 find out what works best where.
Two hundred and forty seven burglary reduction projects have been funded, covering over
2.1million households that suffered around 110,000 burglaries a year. Three distraction
burglary projects have also been funded.
The RBI Evaluation
Three consortia of universities have intensively evaluated the first round of 63 RBI projects.
A further five projects from subsequent rounds of the RBI (rounds two and three) are also
being evaluated.
This report grew out of an evaluation of three RBI sites where improving police
investigative performance was a key strategy. Prior research in this area has focussed
on specif ic invest igative methods and organisat ional/procedural aspects of
investigation. In contrast, this study seeks to explore the nature of the investigative
process with respect to burglary and to develop general principles for effective
investigation. Though the report draws its lessons from three burglary projects, the
findings have significant policy and practice implications for the investigation of volume
crime generally.
The report is part of a series of studies examining burglary reduction practice being
published during 2002/03. It is being published alongside two other reports: ‘Planning for
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partnership’, and ‘Pushing back the boundaries: New techniques for assessing the impact of
burglary schemes’. Also to be published is a report on the overall impact and cost-
effectiveness of Round 1 of the RBI. Other themes to be covered in this series are:
 the delivery of burglary reduction projects;
 publicity and awareness of burglary reduction schemes; and
 the use of an undercover operation as a means to reduce burglary.
Previously published RBI reports
Early lessons from the RBI have already been published in the following reports, which are
available from www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pubsintro1.html
Tilley N, Pease K, Hough M and Brown R (1999) ‘Burglary Prevention: Early Lessons from the
Crime Reduction Programme’ Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 1, London: Home Office
Curtin L, Tilley N, Owen M and Pease K (2001) ‘ Developing Crime Reduction Plans: Some
Examples from the Reducing Burglary Initiative’ Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 7,
London: Home Office
Hedderman C and Williams C (2001) ‘ Making Partnership Work: Emerging Findings from
the Reducing Burglary Initiative’ Briefing Note 1/01, London: Home Office
Johnson S and Loxley C (2001) ‘ Installing Alley-gates: Practical Lessons from Burglary
Prevention Projects’ Briefing Note 2/01, London: Home Office
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Executive summary
Though the number of domestic burglaries committed in England and Wales has fallen in
recent years, reversing the trend of the 1980s and early 1990s, the overall level of incidents
of domestic burglary remains high, as does public concern about the crime. The proportion
of burglary offences detected by the police has traditionally been low, and remains so. Only
12 per cent of recorded burglaries were detected in the year 2001-02.
This study considers ways in which burglaries can be investigated more effectively. It
examines the policing of burglary in three areas: Oxford, Chiltern Vale and Coventry. The
research grew out of Home Office evaluations of burglary Strategic Development Projects
(SDPs) in the three sites.
The research involved a review of the data gathered as part of the local SDP evaluation,
and the collection of further information on police enforcement practices and recent burglary
investigations. This latter phase of the research was a qualitative exercise, which comprised
the following elements:
 examination of case studies of burglary investigations;
 focus groups and semi-structured interviews with police officers involved in the
investigation of burglary; and
 observation of investigative work.
Aims of the study
The study has two main aims:
 to explore the nature of the investigative process with respect to burglary: that is,
to identify the main components of investigation, and to consider how the process
can best be conceptualised; and
 to use these findings to develop general principles for the effective investigation of
burglary.
In addressing the above aims, this report seeks to fill a gap in the existing literature on burglary
investigation. For the most part, previous research has focused on the specific elements and
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practices of investigation, and on the merits or otherwise of competing approaches. In contrast,
this research has developed an understanding of investigation as a general process, and has
sought to identify the underlying principles that can optimise the effectiveness of this process.
Thus, at a time when police enforcement activities are coming under increasing scrutiny, the
findings reported upon here should assist policy-makers and senior managers in the police
to put the core principles of effective investigation at the heart of whatever specific strategies
or approaches are promoted. Moreover, by focusing on principles – which can get
obscured behind a preoccupation with the structures or management of investigative work –
this study tackles issues relevant not simply to the investigation of burglary but to the
investigation of all volume crime.
Thanks to its process perspective on investigation, this report complements the recent work
of the National Criminal Intelligence Service in designing the National Intelligence Model
(NIM), and that of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in producing its
Investigation of Volume Crime Manual (2002). By developing a holistic but detailed account
of what the investigation of burglary necessarily entails, in terms of ‘on the ground’ policing
work, this study provides a context for the strategic and procedural prescriptions contained
in both the NIM and the ACPO manual.
The nature of the investigative process
The research produced two major findings about the nature of burglary investigations. The
first is that the investigative process tends to be highly complex; the second is that ‘reactive’
investigative work is usually tightly bound up with ‘proactive’ work.
Complexity
The study found that the investigation of burglary was very often a complex and multi-
dimensional process. Police enquiries relating to one offence are likely to be intertwined
with investigations of related burglaries or other offences. Sometimes these linked offences
may have only a single suspect, but equally groups of suspects may be involved in some or
all of them. At any point in an investigation, moreover, criminal activities that have occurred
at very different times and in different places may come into view.
Given the high levels of public concern about burglary and its low detection rate, there has
long been a desire within both the police and central government to increase the
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effectiveness of investigative work and to impose tighter managerial controls upon it.
However, the recognition of the complexity and diversity of the investigative process points to
the inherent difficulty of developing strategic models to guide working practices and staffing
structures for the investigation of burglary. It is clear that simple, linear characterisations of the
investigative process can be of little value to the efforts to enhance effectiveness.
If it is to be useful, a model of burglary investigation should be fluid and dynamic. Any such
model should, at its most basic level, present an understanding of the investigation of
burglary as a process of building:
a) networks of communication between individuals and agencies, linking:
b) items of information about individual offences; and
c) items of information about individual offenders.
The interrelationship between proactive and reactive policing
Part of the complexity of the investigative process lies in the fact that the focus of police
attention may constantly shift between an individual offence, other offences, a particular
suspect, and possibly other suspects. Most burglary investigations, it appears, combine
some elements of reactive work – that is, work based on enquiries into individual offences –
with elements of proactive work – that is, the targeting of specific offenders through the use
of intelligence and/or crime analysis.
Hence a successful investigation may be one in which a piece of reactive work – for
example, obtaining a witness description of a suspect – provides the impetus for what
then becomes a wider operation targeting a known local offender and his associates.
Conversely, a pre-existing proactive operation may finally bear fruit when evidence that
emerges from a crime scene (through reactive policing) proves sufficient for an arrest
and charge.
Indeed, proactive policing is often not simply intertwined with but dependent on reactive
work, since the latter generally provides the leads and evidence that can be used in detaining
a targeted offender. At the same time, good reactive work in a sense depends on proactivity,
as the police may respond to individual incidents most thoroughly and effectively when
operating within a broad proactive framework. For example, the standard of reporting of
burglaries by uniformed staff may be improved where the initial investigations of individual
burglaries are seen as integral elements of a wider process of disrupting criminals and
preventing crime, rather than being treated as isolated, largely administrative tasks.
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The close interrelationship between proactive and reactive approaches to the investigation of
burglary suggests that the somewhat one-sided emphasis on the value of proactive policing
that runs through much recent debate and guidance on policing policy may be unhelpful.
Accordingly, assumptions about the inherent superiority of proactivity should be replaced by
an understanding of proactive and reactive policing as complementary rather than competing.
Such a perspective may help to erode cultural resistance to proactive work within the police,
and assist the development of mechanisms for integrating fully the two approaches.
General principles for effective investigation
Taking into account the multi-layered nature of burglary investigation, and the inter-
connectedness of proactive and reactive work, three broad principles for effective
investigative work can be identified. These are:
 Routine
 Simplicity
 Flexibility.
Routine
To emphasise the importance of routine to the investigation of burglary at the same time as
highlighting the complexity and diversity of the process may seem a little contradictory. In
fact, it is precisely because investigation tends to be fluid and open-ended that it is
important to carry out key elements of the process within set parameters, so as to enhance
accountability and ensure some degree of consistency in actions undertaken.
The part of burglary investigation that can most easily be routinised is the initial stage: that
is, from the point that the police are first notified of the offence through to attendance (if
required) by scenes of crime officers. Officers interviewed for this study were aware of the
importance of routine in early investigation, and attempts had been made to standardise
procedures in all the field-work sites. Implementation of the procedures, however, was often
problematic. It is clear, therefore, that having systematic procedures enshrined in policy is
not enough: the policy will not work in practice without adequate communication, training,
supervision and resourcing of staff.
Following initial investigation, the process of allocating offences for further investigation – or
‘crime screening’ – must also be systematic. The benefits of a systematic process of crime
screening are not simply that the activities of investigating officers are most likely to be
The Reducing Burglary Initiative: investigating burglary
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focused on appropriate cases. In addition, accountability for the investigation of individual
cases should be enhanced, as should a sense of ownership of investigative work among
those responsible for it.
The importance of routine relates also to the process of information exchange among police
officers. Whether this takes place by means of verbal, written or electronic briefings, it is
crucial that information about local offences and intelligence about offenders is pooled
among all officers with responsibility for investigation. Electronic databases should ensure
that officers can immediately retrieve the information they require – which in turn demands
that this information is entered accurately, routinely and promptly on the relevant databases,
and that officers have access to them and knowledge of how to use them. Additionally,
systems should be in place for routine communication between the police and other
agencies (such as the courts, prison service and probation service) to ensure that
information about suspects and offenders – such as bail conditions, compliance with
community sentences, and prison releases – is received by the police.
Routine: recommendations
 The activities that must be carried out in the initial investigation of a burglary
should be clearly defined, fully communicated to all relevant officers, and
properly supervised.
 Systems for crime screening should be clear-cut and transparent, to ensure
consistency and accountability in the allocation of individual cases of further
investigation.
 Systems of verbal, written and electronic briefings should be in place to ensure a
constant flow of relevant information between officers involved – in all ways – in
the investigation of burglaries.
 Information on offences, suspects and offenders must be routinely, promptly and
accurately entered on electronic databases that are user-friendly: that is,
physically accessible and not overly complex.
 There is a need for routinised inter-agency communication about offenders and
suspects – for example, relating to prison releases – and systems to ensure that
information received by the police from other agencies is promptly disseminated
among relevant officers.
 Officers need to have a clear idea of their information needs as they relate to
their particular working roles – and officers should be adequately trained to
ensure they routinely make best use of available information sources.
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Simplicity
While the investigation of burglary tends to be a complex process, investigative work can
be most effective when police officers respond in relatively simple ways to the situations and
chains of events on which their enquiries are focused. In particular, given the lack of
sophistication of most prolific burglars, basic investigative actions may often prove highly
rewarding. These might include, for example, the following up of known routes of disposal
of stolen property; or making additional efforts to contact potential witnesses over and
above any initial house-to-house enquiries carried out at the scene.
The principle of simplicity can usefully be applied to communication between police officers.
The findings of this study indicate that informal, direct communication between officers can
play a vital part in investigative work. The advantage of this kind of communication – both
within and between departments – is that it potentially allows the most relevant information
on a given issue to be quickly and clearly exchanged between the officers for whom it has
most significance. By definition, the nature and extent of informal communication cannot be
determined by policy; but certain working arrangements can promote it: for example,
keeping office doors open and locating particular offices in close proximity to each other
can play an important part.
Evidence from the fieldwork sites suggests that simple forms of crime analysis can produce
positive results. This may involve little more than plotting recent offences on a map to see if
they may have been committed by the same individual or group, and reviewing intelligence
on known offenders who may be in the area. In some respects, sophisticated, electronic
crime analysis systems may appear slow and cumbersome in comparison to the kinds of
simple analysis carried out manually or in the minds of officers, and often enhanced through
informal consultation with colleagues.
Simple responses to burglary should nevertheless be informed responses. However simple
they may be, actions taken by the police need to be knowledge-based: that is, based on
generalised criminological knowledge of the kinds of police activities that can be expected
to yield results, styles and methods of offending, and patterns of victimisation, as well as on
specific knowledge of local offences and offenders.
Simplicity: Recommendations
 It is important to consider the possible utility of undertaking certain simple and
quick investigative actions (such as following up known routes of stolen property)
over and above the minimum required of every investigation.
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 Informal communication, which allows information to be conveyed quickly,
simply and directly between officers, can play a vital part in investigative work.
Efforts should be made to encourage such communication and to encourage
cross -depar tmental sharing of information more general ly. Informal
communication should though occur within a context of properly implemented,
formal briefings.
 Simple methods of crime analysis can be effective in the investigation of burglary
– such as plotting offences on a map, or manually recording details of offences in
a form that permits officers easily to review the information.
 The potential value of more sophisticated methods of crime analysis should
nevertheless not be overlooked. Simple analysis should be viewed as a process
on which more complex analytical work can build, as required.
Flexibility
The principle of flexibility refers to the critical importance of gathering, recording,
communicating and acting upon available information in a way that is responsive to
investigative opportunities as and when these present themselves. The need for flexibility
goes hand-in-hand with a need for rapidity, as the police response must usually be quick as
well as flexible if it is to have any pay-off.
There can be no clearer illustration of the importance of flexibility and rapidity than when
the police receive a report of a burglary that is in progress. An immediate response to such
a report is crucial, given that a significant proportion of primary burglary detections result
from burglars being caught in the act or very shortly thereafter. Arriving quickly at the
scene of a burglary reported as in progress can prove rewarding even if the offender has
by then made his escape, as there may be immediate avenues of enquiry that can fruitfully
be explored.
The principle of flexibility relates closely to the issue of access to information. Rapid
dissemination and retrieval of information ensures that investigating officers have access to
the specific facts or intelligence they need, whenever they need them. Due to the multitude
of demands on the time and attention of officers, valuable opportunities for detection may
be lost if certain items of information become available after a critical point in the
investigation has passed. The importance of rapid dissemination and retrieval of information
is illustrated by several of the case studies examined for this research, in which officers were
able to act on very recent information in pressing charges for burglary against suspects who
had just been arrested for other offences.
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A flexible and rapid response to what proves to be a pivotal moment in an investigation –
such as the arrest of a suspect in relation to an apparently unrelated offence, a coincidental
sighting of a known offender, or an unexpected indication by a suspect being interviewed
that he is prepared to co-operate with the police – can be the prime determinant of success.
A certain randomness or unpredictability may thus characterise many aspects of an
investigation. This points, perhaps, to the inherent limitations of an entirely routinised
approach to the investigation of burglary, but it by no means undermines the need for
elements of routine within the investigative process.
Flexibility: recommendations
 The resourcing of departments involved in the investigation of burglary should
take into account the fact that successful investigation often depends on the
capacity of officers to respond immediately and flexibly to random events.
 A rapid and flexible response to a burglary in progress is important not only
because this offers the opportunity of catching the offender at the scene, but also
because immediate avenues of enquiry may be available even if the offender has
made his escape prior to the arrival of the police.
 Rapid dissemination and retrieval of information about offences is often crucial,
as this helps links between recent offences to be identified. Hence information
about offences must be promptly entered on to databases, and officers must be
willing and able to access up-to-date information from any available source (such
as crime and control logs of calls from the public).
 Suspects may react in unpredictable and inconsistent ways to police interviews;
officers must therefore have the skills and motivation to respond appropriately to
any indication by a suspect that he is prepared to co-operate.
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1 Introduction
The number of domestic burglaries committed in England and Wales has fallen sharply since
the mid-1990s. However, the most recent Home Office figures suggest that this downward
trend is slowing, and levels of public concern about burglary remain high1. Anxiety about
domestic burglary is doubtless connected to the fact that it ‘conjures up many frightening
and disturbing images – of violent strangers in the night, ransacked rooms, fouling of
property and sexual assault’ (Maguire, 1982: 164).
The proportion of burglary offences detected by the police has traditionally been low. This
continues to be the case, despite recent rapid advances in communications technology and
forensic science, and the considerable efforts that have been put into improving the
management of investigative work over the past two decades. Home Office statistics show
that only 12 per cent of residential and non-residential burglaries were detected in the year
2001-022. The detection rate for all property crime (including burglary) is only a little
higher, at 16 per cent. This compares with a detection rate of 23 per cent for recorded
crime as a whole (Home Office, 2001b).
Against this background of high levels of concern about residential burglary (henceforth
referred to simply as ‘burglary’), and low detection rates, this study considers ways of
improving the effectiveness of burglary investigation. This has been undertaken by means
of an empirical study of investigations of burglary in three policing areas – namely:
Oxford, Chiltern Vale and Coventry – together with a review of relevant literature on
criminal investigation.
1
1 Findings of the British Crime Survey (BCS) of 2001-02 indicate that 3.5 per cent of all households in England
and Wales had at least one burglary or attempted burglary over the previous 12 months, which amounts to a
total of 991,000 burglaries (including attempts). The BCS also reports that that 22 per cent of respondents
thought it very or fairly likely that they would have their home burgled over the following year (Home Office,
2002).
2 There are various categories of detected offences: that is those which have resulted in a charge, summons or
caution, those (whether or not previously recorded) which have been taken into consideration (TIC) by the courts
following an admission by the perpetrator, and those in relation to which no further action has been taken,
because, for example, the perpetrator is under the age of criminal responsibility.
Aims of the study
This study has two primary aims:
1. To look at what the investigation of burglary necessitates, and how the process
can best be conceptualised.
2. On the basis of the findings regarding the nature of investigative process, to
identify general principles for effective investigation of burglary.
In addressing these two aims, it is intended that the study will help to fill a gap in the
existing literature on investigating burglary. For the most part, previous research and related
policy literature have focused on the different elements of investigation, in order to assess
the outcomes associated with alternative practices. In contrast, this research has sought to
develop an overarching view of investigation as a process, and thereby to gain insight into
how the effectiveness of the process can be optimised. 
Thanks to its process perspective on burglary investigation, this study provides a context for
aspects of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) recently developed by the National
Criminal Intelligence Service on behalf of the ACPO Crime Committee (NCIS, 2000), and
currently being implemented by police forces across England and Wales. The NIM seeks to
integrate investigation and the use of intelligence within the broader policing enterprise,
and proposes a clear set of organisational structures for developing investigative strategy
and tactics.
By describing and analysing the ways in which the detective process links offenders to
offences, this study provides a complementary analysis to that contained within the NIM. It
is designed to help those working at a policy or strategic level to understand how detection
actually works in ‘real life’, and hence to recognise the functionality and implications of the
structures and processes developed under the NIM.
At the same time as helping to locate the NIM within the context of day-to-day policing, the
findings of this study also provide a framework within which to understand the detailed
prescriptions for investigative work contained within the ACPO Investigation of Volume Crime
Manual (ACPO, 2002). The manual is intended to assist front-line policing staff to fulfil their
duties with respect to volume crime investigations. These specific duties, however, cannot or
should not be viewed in isolation from each other or from the wider process of investigation
itself. The findings of this study, presented over the course of this report, illustrate in vivid
detail how the many different components of the investigative process come together.
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The focus on burglary
For the purposes of this study, domestic burglary has been treated as a single crime type.
This is not, however, meant to imply that all offences are the same. There is considerable
variation in the modus operandi (or MOs) of burglaries and consequently in the meaning
of an offence for its victim. Burglars themselves vary in their more general offending
behaviour – in accordance with their age and experience, the extent to which they
specialise in burglary as opposed to other offences, the nature of any drugs problem, and
their tendency to commit local and opportunist burglaries or to travel further afield and
plan their offences3. Patterns of victimisation also vary widely between households with
different characteristics and between different kinds of areas. As noted by Mawby (2002),
past research from national to local studies have found repeat victimisation to be a
common feature of burglary.
There are many implications of the variations in patterns of offending and victimisation for
the process of investigation. For example, the identification of a series of offences may be
dependent on the recognition of specific MOs; the emergence of burglary ‘hot-spots’ may
indicate links with known local offenders; frequent revictimisation may point to the presence
of certain highly prolific offenders. The tracing of patterns and variations should thus always
be an integral part of the investigative process, whatever specific form this process takes.
While this study is primarily focused on burglary, many of the issues to be discussed here
have a bearing on the investigation of crime more generally. In particular, there are many
parallels between the investigation of burglary, as discussed in this report, and the
investigation of other volume crimes – suggesting that the nature of the process is broadly
similar, as are the principles for effective investigative work. Indeed, individual burglary
investigations may frequently overlap with investigations of other offences, and especially
other property crimes, since many burglars do not confine themselves to burglary4.
The investigation of very serious crime, on the other hand, raises many issues that
cannot be addressed on these pages. Nevertheless, the investigation of burglary is like
the investigation of all crime in that it is, at its core, a process of ‘linking … evidence
from the scene with information about likely offenders’ (Audit Commission, 1993: 35).
3
Introduction
3 Previous research, as reviewed by Mawby (2001), suggests that the majority of burglars tend to operate close to
home. As noted by Maguire (1982), a minority of burglars are prepared to travel to very wealthy areas to steal
high-value property, and have relatively sophisticated methods. In the fieldwork sites, local burglars were the
primary focus of police activity – with the exception of a single extremely prosperous locality within one of the
sites, which was targeted by travelling burglars.
4 Mawby’s review of the literature on burglar characteristics (2001) found there to be a general consensus that
burglars tend also to commit other offences of various kinds. 
Thinking at a higher level of generality still, any criminal investigation can be regarded
as a process of ‘reconstructing the past’, and hence as a variant of the kinds of inquiry
conducted by all scientists and social scientists who are concerned with the past
(Osterburg and Ward, 2000).
The fieldwork
The three sites in which the fieldwork was carried out varied in terms of their geography
and demographics, their burglary rates and, to a certain extent, their approaches to
burglary investigation. Of the three policing areas, Oxford had the highest burglary rate
over the years 1999-2001 (see Table 1.1 for figures)5. Appendix A contains a brief
description of the policing of burglary in each of the three areas.
Table 1.1: Burglary rates in the field-work sites, 1999-2001
Burglary rate: offences per 1000 households
Oxford Chiltern Vale Coventry National 
average
April 99-Mar 00 50 24 20 22
April 00-Mar 01 37 18 16 20
The empirical research conducted for this study grew out of Home Office evaluations of
burglary Strategic Development Projects (SDPs) that were implemented within the policing
areas of Oxford, Chiltern Vale and Coventry and funded as part of the Home Office Reducing
Burglary Initiative6. The SDP evaluations were carried out from late 1999 to early 2001, and
involved the collection of data on burglary and other acquisitive crimes, and the analysis of the
range of initiatives introduced under the projects. The evaluative work on the enforcement
aspects of the SDPs provided initial insights into the issues that became central to this study.
These early insights were built upon through fieldwork conducted over the period of
February to December 2001 in the three policing areas. This was a qualitative exercise,
which comprised the following elements:
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5 One of the criteria for funding of burglary SDPs was that the burglary rate within the SDP target area should be
at least twice the national average. Clearly, the burglary rate of each target area was not necessarily reflected
in the burglary rate of the wider policing area. 
6 The SDPs, which included both crime prevention and enforcement elements, were focused on ‘target areas’ that
were smaller than the policing areas in which they were located.
 case study reviews;
 focus groups with police officers;
 semi-structured interviews with police officers; and
 observational exercises.
See Appendix B for details on these fieldwork activities.
Outline of the report
The fieldwork conducted for this study produced two major findings about the nature of
burglary investigations. The first of these, which is discussed in Chapter 2 of this report, is
that the process of investigation tends to be highly complex and, in a sense, ‘messy’: that is,
it tends to be a fluid and open-ended process, made up of many different interlinking and
overlapping elements.
The second major finding, presented in Chapter 3, concerns the inter-relationship between
what are commonly referred to as ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive’ investigative activities. Part of
the complexity of the investigative process lies in the fact that its focus tends to be constantly
shifting between an individual offence, other offences, a particular suspect, and possibly
other suspects. Hence it can be seen that ‘reactive’ work carried out in relation to one or
more offences often becomes tightly bound up with ‘proactive’, or offender-based,
investigative work.
Taking into account this multi-layered nature of burglary investigation, and insights offered
by the burglary case study reviews and other fieldwork findings, the report moves on to
consider what general principles should guide the investigative process. Chapter 4 looks at
the first of three principles to be elaborated: namely, routine. It is argued that there must be
systematic and well-defined procedures for the initial investigation of offences, the allocation
of cases for further investigation, and the sharing of information about offences and
offenders. Precisely because investigation tends to be fluid and open-ended, it becomes all
the more important that key elements of the process are carried out within set parameters, so
as to enhance accountability and ensure consistency in actions undertaken.
Chapter 5 is concerned with the principle of simplicity. It is suggested here that while the
process of investigation as a whole tends to be complex, the specific steps that officers need
to take in order to achieve results are often straightforward. For example, much can be
gained from informal, discussion between officers about a suspect; basic analysis of crime
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patterns; and simple investigative actions such as following up possible routes of disposal of
stolen property. However, to emphasise simplicity is not to overlook the importance of
adopting a knowledge-based approach to investigation.
Chapter 6 develops the third principle: flexibility. At any stage of a burglary investigation,
certain pieces of information may come to light that will have a major bearing on its
outcome. In many cases, this information may emerge in an unpredictable manner – and it
may perhaps appear to be the product of sheer chance rather than strenuous investigative
effort. If full advantage is to be taken of any such pivotal moment in an investigation, the
police must be able to respond flexibly and rapidly to it: that is, to record, communicate and
act upon the information appropriately and without delay.
Chapter 7 concludes the report by bringing together some of the key issues raised and presenting
a series of recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of burglary investigation.
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Suspect arrested, charged and
subsequently convicted
Evidence linked to suspect (e.g.
fingerprint match)
Evidence found at the scene (e.g.
fingerprint)
Police and scenes of crime officer
(SOCO) attend scene
Burglary reported to the police
2 The complexity of the investigative process
The process of investigation
A straightforward burglary investigation might involve the elements in Figure 2.1. Here, an
offence is reported to the police, which leads to evidence being found at the scene, which is
connected to a suspect who is then arrested, charged and convicted. These are the bare
bones of the process summarised by the Audit Commission (1993) as the linking of
evidence from the scene to information about an offender.
Figure 2.1: Straightforward burglary investigation
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In practice, this simple chain of events tends to occur as one part of a much wider network
of events. For example, a single offence may lead to the arrest of a suspect who is then
linked to several more offences through separate evidence and through apparent
connections between the offences themselves. The suspect may first deny all the offences but
subsequently admit to some of them and then to others that the police had not yet associated
with him, in the hope that most will be taken into consideration (TIC) by the courts. A
number of offences may be committed while he is on bail for those with which he was
previously charged7. Furthermore, in pursuing this investigation the police may come into
contact with criminal associates of this particular offender.
A diagrammatic representation of this kind of complex process is provided in Figure 2.2,
which outlines a hypothetical case. This diagram also shows that the focus of an
investigation may move back and forth through time, as attention shifts between an offence
committed on a given date and offences committed prior to and after that date.
Furthermore, again as in Figure 2.2, the investigation of a set of offences associated with
a particular suspect may overlap with investigations into other kinds of crimes – possibly
carried out in other areas and hence being dealt with by other police forces. Thus it is
clear that investigation tends not to be a uni-linear process but frequently has several
dimensions and layers.
The social context within which a set of offences and their investigation take place can add
further dimensions to the investigative process. For example, an investigation of burglaries
carried out in a crime ‘hot-spot’ with high levels of repeat victimisation may bring into focus
a number of local, prolific offenders and a range of crime types. In contrast, an
investigation of a series of high-value burglaries carried out in a prosperous area may bring
the investigating officers into contact with detectives in neighbouring forces who are seeking
the same travelling burglar and associates.
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7 Several of the police officers interviewed for this study spoke about the tendency of some burglars to ‘go on a
spree’ of burgling after being charged and released on bail, since at this point they may believe that they are
facing prison in any case and therefore have little to lose. This view appeared to be based largely on anecdotal
evidence. A Home Office evaluation of a bail project (Morgan and Henderson, 1998) looked at the extent of
offending on bail. This found that in 1993 and 1994, 29 per cent of defendants charged with burglary and
granted court bail were convicted for further offences committed while on bail.
Figure 2.2: Complex burglary investigation
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17 March – AB arrested re B1.
Found to have watch from B3 in his
possession. AB's home address
searched. Goods from B4 found. AB
charged with B3 & B4 and
questioned about B1 & B2. Denies
all offences. Released on bail
10 March – Vehicle stopped by
police. Associate of AB, KL,
found to be driving it at the time.
KL already wanted by police in
connection with a robbery.
Arrested for this offence
8 March – vehicle
linked to AB. AB
matches witness
description 11 March –
KL charged
with robbery
Witness
description &
report of car
driving away
from the area
18 March –
Routine check at
pawn shop.
Goods from B5
found. Description
of seller matches
AB
19 March – AB re-
arrested.
Questioned about
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police bail
pending further
enquiries
15 June – Fingerprint
Bureau matches B5
prints to AB. AB has
already admitted this
offence
17 April – AB attends
identification parade
re B1. Witness
identifies AB. AB
charged with B1
17 April – AB admits B1, B3 & B4. Admits a
further 15 offences which are TICd including B2
and B5. Some of the offences were committed
while AB was on bail
Jewellery
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found at scene
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Burglary 1
[B1]
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Burglary 2
[B2]
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Burglary 3
[B3]
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Burglary 4
[B4]
15 March
Burglary 5
[B5]
16 March
The case studies described in Box 2.1 and Box 2.2 illustrate the multi-faceted nature of
burglary investigation. The first example is the case of a known, highly prolific burglar who
was arrested for burglary following an arrest for shoplifting and the discovery of stolen
property at his address. The second concerns three individuals who were arrested in
relation to the theft of a large quantity of property, after a witness reported seeing the
property being unloaded from a vehicle.
Box 2.1: Denials and admissions by offender Sam P-
In the autumn of 2001, Middleton detectives were aware that 20-year-old Sam P-, who
had previous convictions for burglary, shoplifting and other offences, was living in a
hostel in the city. It was observed that the number of burglaries in the area around the
hostel had started to rise. On 24 October 2001, Sam was arrested for shoplifting.
Because he was a known burglar, a Detective Constable (DC) – who learnt of his arrest
through a routine check of the computerised custody records – requested a search of his
room at the hostel. This was undertaken that evening, and various items were recovered.
While the shoplifting offence was being dealt with, consultation between DCs in different
teams led to a decision to arrest Sam for a burglary committed on 21 October [B.1], in
the course of which the intruder had confronted the elderly female householder while she
was in her bath. Sam’s appearance seemed to match the description given by the
aggrieved; however, he denied the offence.
Sam was remanded in custody, and the following day (25 October) was given police
bail with respect to B.1 (this case was subsequently dropped due to lack of evidence).
Before being released, he was arrested for a burglary committed on 23 October [B.2],
from which – it had just been established – property had been taken similar to items
found in his room the previous evening. Later that day, this property was positively
identified by the aggrieved (who was elsewhere in Britain at the time, but made a
statement to local police about unique markings on two videotapes that had been taken).
Sam denied the offence.
While dealing with matters relating to B.2, officers noted a report of an attempted burglary
on 23 October [B.3]. This was linked to Sam on the grounds of a witness description and the
modus operandi (MO), which was similar to that of B.2. Moreover, Sam had been limping
when arrested, and the suspect from B.3 had been seen to jump from a first-floor window.
Sam was questioned about B.3, but denied it and was never charged with the offence.
The Reducing Burglary Initiative: investigating burglary
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At 1 pm on 25 October Sam was charged with B.2. While being fingerprinted, he
began to talk about his severe crack addiction, and said he needed help. When told that
he might be able to receive a Drug Treatment and Testing Order (DTTO) in lieu of a
prison sentence for burglary, if he showed willingness to address his criminal behaviour,
Sam stated that he wanted to confess to all his ‘jobs’.
Two officers immediately took him on a ‘drive around’, so that he could point to
properties he had burgled. On the drive, and subsequently in interview at the police
station, he admitted to a total of 18 burglaries, most of which dated from earlier that
year. He continued to deny B.1, B.2 and B.3, but admitted to an earlier burglary [B.4] at
the address of B.3. Sam was charged with B. 4, and requested that the others he had
admitted be taken into consideration (TIC’d). He was remanded in custody, and while in
custody later admitted to approximately 50 burglaries he had committed in a different
police area within the same force. 
In December 2001, Sam was sentenced to an 18-month DTTO, having pleaded guilty to
B.4 and a handling charge with respect to B.2. However, within two weeks of starting the
DTTO he was required to leave the residential treatment centre because he had entered
into a relationship with a female resident. He was placed in a bail hostel in Middleton
while a place at another residential service was sought. The police were not informed,
and learnt that Sam had left the initial centre only when an officer saw him by chance in
the city. Over the following week the police stop-checked him twice.
On 2 January a burglary [B.5] was reported from an address which, it was noted by a
DC, had been among Sam’s TICs. The officer asked staff at Sam’s bail hostel to search his
room; two mobile phones taken during the burglary were found. Sam was arrested and
charged with B.5; he denied it and was granted bail by the Magistrates’ Court on
condition that he could be found a place at a drug rehabilitation centre outside Middleton.
At the time of the case study research Sam was on remand, awaiting a rehabilitation
place, and a decision by the courts about the outstanding period of his DTTO.
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Box 2.2: Suspects Don L-, Mark M- and Sally P-
Don L-, a prolific burglar known to Tryton police, was released from prison on licence in
March. By the end of the month the police were looking for him as he was believed to
have breached his licence.
On the morning of 5 April, the police received a report about a vehicle seen in
suspicious circumstances the previous evening. Three males had been seen unloading a
large amount of property from the vehicle into an address in H— Road in Tryton; they
then left in the vehicle and returned a little later with more property.
This particular vehicle had been linked by police intelligence to Don a few days
before. The address in H- Road was known to the police as a drugs den, and as the
home of Sally P-. The police also had intelligence that Mark M-, a local offender, was
currently staying there, and that he was an associate of Don. The witness’s (admittedly
not detailed) description of two of the men unloading property appeared to match Don
and Mark.
At about 1 pm on 5 April, officers set out to arrest Don, and found him driving the vehicle
close to H- Road. He was arrested for breaching his licence, and returned to prison.
Officers searched the H- Road address and came across what was, in their own words,
‘like a scene from Pickfords Removals’. Many items were recovered which – from details
on bank documents – were traced to an address which the police then visited and found
to have been burgled. (The offence had not yet been reported as the occupant was on
holiday.) Sally, as the householder of the H- Road property, was arrested for handling
stolen goods, which she denied.
The aggrieved formally identified the stolen items on 12 April, on his return from holiday.
Mark and Don (the latter having been produced from prison) were subsequently arrested
for the burglary, and denied it. Don admitted to owning the vehicle mentioned above, but
said he had lent it to a friend on the evening of 4 April.
Investigation of the burglary continued over the following months. No forensic evidence
from the scene was found, but Don’s, Mark’s and Sally’s fingerprints were found on much
of the stolen property, as was Mark’s blood. In the meantime, both the male suspects
received prison sentences for previous offences: Don (in May) for burglary, and Mark (in
July) for taking a vehicle without consent.
The Reducing Burglary Initiative: investigating burglary
12
On 29 December – by which time it appeared that no further evidence from the burglary
would be forthcoming – the police charged Don and Mark with burglary/handling,
which they continued to deny. Sally was charged with handling; she now admitted to
having known that the property was from a burglary, and said it had been brought to her
home by two men whom she would not name. At the time of the case study research, the
case was yet to go to trial.
To a large extent, the complexity of the process of investigating burglary and other volume crime
results from the multiplicity of offenders and offending. That is, any such investigation may
concern several offenders (whether working together or loosely associated with each other) and,
because much offending is highly prolific, several or many offences. In contrast, a serious crime
investigation may entail the identification of a single offender in relation to a single offence.
Conceptualising investigation
Over the course of the past two decades, the police service of England and Wales has
embraced a series of reforms carried out with a view to improving efficiency, effectiveness
and accountability. Police investigative activities have come under particular scrutiny over
this time, and – in the light of the poor detection rates associated with many offences,
including burglary – efforts have been made to impose tighter managerial control over
investigation and to introduce more structured and streamlined procedures. The 1993 Audit
Commission report Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively has played an
important part in focusing attention on the need for ‘police managers to secure maximum
benefit from available resources by addressing inefficiency in the management and
deployment of officers in the investigation of crime (Audit Commission, 1993: 22).
The findings of this study with regard to the inherent complexity, and what might also be
called the ‘messiness’, of the investigative process point to some of the difficulties associated
with the attempt to move ‘towards a quality-driven formalisation of investigative techniques’
that could ensure the actions of investigators ‘were prescribed, focused and comprehensively
carried out’ (Gill et al., 1998). Certainly, the findings of the fieldwork demonstrate the
fundamental importance of clarity, consistency and routine in the investigation of burglary (as
will be discussed in Chapter 4). However, it is clear also that the multi-dimensional and
complex nature of investigation means that it is not possible to develop a single, step-by-step
model of burglary investigation that can be applied in all cases. Indeed, to seek to impose a
highly simplified model upon the multi-layered reality would run the risk of constraining the
very activities that can possibly lead to positive outcomes for the police.
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If it is not helpful to conceptualise burglary investigation as a uni-linear chain of possible actions,
it may nevertheless be possible to develop more fluid and dynamic models of the process. The
efforts of policy-makers and senior managers in the police to improve effectiveness and
efficiency in the investigation of burglary (and indeed of other crimes) will perhaps have the
greatest value if they are based on an understanding of investigation as a process of building:
a) networks of communication between individuals and agencies, linking:
b) items of information about individual offences, and
c) tems of information about individual offenders.
Possible components of these networks are presented in Figure 2.3. This diagram
demonstrates the extremely wide range of individuals, agencies, and kinds of information
that can play a part in a burglary investigation. For example, information about a suspect
may emanate not only from police records and those of the prison or probation service, but
also from witnesses, victims, and the suspect’s associates, relatives and employers. This
information may concern not only identifying features of the suspect (such as physical
appearance or fingerprints), but also his criminal history, general circumstances, and typical
activities. Similarly, information about offences can be of many different kinds and in many
different forms, and can come from many different sources.
The ‘human factor’
The complexity and multi-dimensionality of the process of investigation stems from the fact
that investigating burglary is, ultimately, about investigating the actions of individuals. It is
therefore a matter of dealing with the randomness and vast diversity of human reality. What
is more, given that many burglars lead chaotic lives – particularly the substantial number
who have drug problems8 – this ‘human factor’ in investigative work may often be especially
difficult to define. For example, neither the specific offending behaviours of burglars, nor (as
will be further discussed in Chapter 6) their responses to apprehension by the police may be
easily predicted. Cromwell et al., reporting on the findings of their study of burglars, point to
the ‘here-and-now orientation’ of most burglars, and particularly those who are using drugs.
In committing their offences, they tend not to engage in careful planning but to work
opportunistically and to seek ‘satisfactory target choices, not optimal ones’ (1991: 89)9.
The Reducing Burglary Initiative: investigating burglary
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8 Mawby (2001) reports that previous research in both Britain and the USA, particularly from the past fifteen
years, has found a close connection between drug misuse and burglary. The large majority of suspects in the
cases examined for this study were believed by the police to have drug problems.
9 Cromwell et al. thus propose a ‘limited rationality explanation of burglary’, in place of ‘the economic model of
crime that relies on the concept of maximization of outcomes’.
Figure 2.3: Components of burglary investigation
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Networks of communication between individuals and
agencies including any of the following, and others:
- victims - forensic labs and bureaux
- suspects - social services
- witnesses - the probation service
- suspects' associates - the prison service
- suspects' family members - bail hostel staff
- police personnel (from - retail outlets (where stolen 
various departments) property is sold/stolen 
- other police forces credit cards are used)
- police informants - suspects' employers
Linkages between items of information
about individual offences, including:
- dates
- times
- location
- modus operandi
- items stolen
- disposal of stolen items
- implements used by suspects
- vehicles used by suspects
- witness descriptions
- forensic evidence (from crime 
scenes or recovered stolen 
property) – e.g. 
- DNA
- fingerprints
- shoeprints
Linkages between items of information
about individual offenders, including:
- addresses
- arrests/charges
- release from prison
- previous convictions
- typical modus operandi
- drug habits
- vehicles
- physical appearance
- DNA
- fingerprints
- shoes
- aliases
- associates
- family members
- employment
- social activities
The ‘human factor’ in an investigation concerns not only the offender but extends also to the
victims. The case described in Box 2.3, below, may not be typical, but illustrates clearly that police
dealings with victims and witnesses can at times throw up unexpected issues and problems.
Box 2.3: Victim Jane S-
At 8 pm on 3 May 2001, Jane S- called the police to report a burglary at her home. The
police attended, and took statements from Jane and her sister, Sheila.
Sheila explained that she and her boyfriend had visited Jane’s home that afternoon. Jane
was out, but there were two young Asian men there, carrying furniture out of the house.
One of them said he was a friend of Jane’s, and that she had sold him the furniture. As
he spoke about Jane in such a way as to suggest that he knew her well, Sheila saw
nothing suspicious in this, and she gave him some advice about how to fit through the
front door a coffee table he was struggling with. Her boyfriend helped the two men put
the table and some other items in their van, which they then drove away.
Sheila then found that the lock on the front door of the house was broken. She made
contact with Jane, and told her what she had seen. Jane said she had not sold her
furniture to anyone, and immediately returned to her house, from where she called the
police. Jane told the police that she believed the young man who had spoken to Sheila to
be an acquaintance of hers, Yunus K- – based on Sheila’s description of him, and the fact
that he knew certain details about her.
Yunus was subsequently arrested by the police on suspicion of the burglary, and given
bail pending an identification parade. Before the parade was held, however, Sheila rang
the police to say that she would not attend, because she had fallen out with her sister and
had no wish to help her. Her boyfriend also would not co-operate; and as no other
witnesses had had a good view of the suspects, and there was no forensic evidence, the
case was taken no further.
The DC who dealt with this case learnt that Jane was well-known locally for having large
numbers of people, including children, drinking in her home – some of whom she would
sometimes accuse of damaging the property or stealing items. She was frequently in contact
with the police, reporting incidents of various kinds. She also appeared to have difficulties with
her son, aged nine, who was believed to have started fires in the house on more than one
occasion. The officer was of the opinion that the above incident was thus part of a pattern of
chaotic and damaging relations between Jane and her wide circle of acquaintances.
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The case of Jane S- reveals a little about the nature of ‘multiple victimization’ – a subject
explored in greater depth by Genn. Genn notes that traditional surveys of crime
victimization, because of their focus on discrete events, fail to capture the process of
victimization experienced by those individuals living ‘on the margins of English urban
society’ for whom ‘violence, abuse and petty theft are an integral part of … day-to-day
existence’ (1988: 91)10.
Consideration of the ‘human factor’ in burglary investigation also brings into focus the issue
of partnership. As should be clear from the preceding discussion, the problem of burglary
has various aspects and is closely related to other problems; hence it demands a range of
responses from a range of different agencies if it is to be tackled successfully.
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10 Genn conducted an ethnographic study of multiple victimization, which focused on one particular woman
(‘Maureen’) and her family. The study found that the police are a part of [Maureen’s] life and perform diverse
functions for (and against) her and her family. ‘They are mediators, friends and enemies. They defuse explosive
situations and they are called in to help in times of trouble. They also interfere in Maureen’s life and are
perceived as persecuting the children of the household’ (1988: 95).
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3 The proactive-reactive relationship
The drive to proactivity
Much research on the investigation of crime has found that ‘in most primary detections, the
offender’s identity is plain from the outset: victims or witnesses can say who did it, or else the
offender is detained at the scene of the crime or is clearly implicated in some other way’ (Hough,
1987: 72). What this means, as Steer points out, is that for the most part the detection of crime
does not result from ‘what the public would perceive as real detective ability’ (Steer, 1980: 71).
Research dating back to the 1970s (for example, the work of Greenwood et al., 1977, in
the USA) has shown this to be true for the detection of burglaries as for other crimes:
burglars who are arrested and charged tend to be apprehended at the scene of the
burglary, or to be identified by a victim or witness. For example, a study by Coupe and
Griffiths (1996) looked a sample of 256 cases of burglary which had resulted in primary
detections. They found that in 43 per cent of these cases the offender was arrested at or
near the scene, and in 34 per cent the principal method of detection was the questioning of
witnesses (victims or neighbours) at the scene. Hence in only 23 per cent of cases were
detections achieved in the absence of almost immediate indications of the offender. 
Similarly, Burrows (1986) found that in only 18 per cent of 219 cases of primary detection
did arrests follow police enquiries lasting more than 24 hours when there were no direct
leads from the scene. Burrows concludes that the poor results associated with lengthier
enquiries did not necessarily reflect a lack of commitment to such enquiries. Rather, he
argues that his study ‘provides no support for the assumption that the chance of a burglary
being cleared up is determined simply by the ability of the police to put sufficient time into
its investigation’ (1986: 77).
The crucial importance of immediate action and information in the detection of crime helps to
explain the particularly low clear-up rate associated with burglary. As noted by Maguire
(1982), by the time a burglary is reported the offender is usually well away from the scene of
the crime11, and offenders are not usually known to the victims and so cannot be identified if
seen. Mawby contrasts burglary with other offences: ‘Unlike violent offences, there is rarely an
available witness to name or describe the perpetrator, and unlike drug offences the
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11 Coupe and Griffiths (1996) found that only 10 per cent of burglaries in the study area were reported to the
police as ‘in progress’.
identification of an offence does not almost inevitably bring with it the identification of a
suspect’ (2001: 167-8). In the absence of witnesses, forensic evidence can potentially play an
important part in pointing to an offender, but is found at a small minority of burglary scenes12. 
The limitations of investigative work based on enquiries at individual crime scenes – that is,
traditional ‘reactive’ policing – have been widely recognised. They led the Home Office, the
Audit Commission and senior managers in the police to place an increasingly heavy emphasis on
a ‘proactive’ approach to the policing of burglary and other crimes. Proactive work targets
prolific criminals through the use of intelligence and crime pattern analysis (cf. Audit Commission,
1993). Typical strategies of proactive policing, as described by Maguire and Norris, include: 
“Engineering frequent checks, stops and searches of prolific offenders in the hope of
catching them with evidence of criminal offences; the use of surveillance or informants
to obtain intelligence about their activities; and, whenever they are in detention or in
custody, obtaining as many admissions from them as possible” (1992: 8-9)13. 
This move to proactivity was of course closely linked to the other changes to policing
practices and management which – as discussed above – were introduced over the
past two decades with the intention of producing a more effective and efficient police
service (Innes, 2000). However, research on the subject suggests that the extent of
proactive, or what is often called ‘intelligence-led’, policing remains limited in many
police forces. 
According to Maguire and Norris (1992), for example, divisional detectives commonly found
that the pressures of work arising from administrative tasks together with the numbers of
offences that demanded immediate response left little time for genuine proactive policing.
Maguire and John’s study of proactive work in various police forces (1995) found that where
there was no major organisational reform to support proactivity, officers were easily diverted
by reactive demands, and a certain amount of ‘cultural’ resistance to new working practices
also inhibited proactivity. Reviewing the British literature of the 1980s and 1990s, Heaton
(2000) reinforces Maguire and John’s message that effective proactive policing demands
organisational change rather than the simple addition of proactive units to existing structures.
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12 Coupe and Griffiths (1996) report that forensic evidence was found and tested at only 9 per cent of all burglary
scenes visited by SOCO in the study area (however, they note that this figure may be an under-estimate). In only
6 per cent of the detected cases studied by these researchers was the use of forensic evidence the principal
method of detection.
13 It should be noted that since April 1999 admissions from offenders serving prison sentences have not been
classed as detections under Home Office counting rules – other than in cases where there is sufficient evidence for
a charge to be laid, in addition to an admission. However, offences that are admitted by offenders after charge
but prior to conviction, and are asked to be taken into consideration (TIC), are included within detections.
The interconnectedness of proactive and reactive work
The case studies in this project reveal that proactive approaches to investigation tend to
be tightly bound up with reactive work. In other words, proactive and reactive policing
appear to be not so much alternative methods as part and parcel of the same process.
What often happens in an investigation is that the focus of police attention and activity
constantly shifts between a past offence or offences and the suspect or suspects
associated with them.
Proactive and reactive investigative work can perhaps most usefully be regarded as the two
ends of a spectrum. At the ‘extreme’ proactive end, for example, an investigation might start
when the police learn from an informant that a particular offender is currently active. A
surveillance operation might then lead to the offender being arrested while committing a
crime – before any prior offences are specifically identified with him. At the ‘extreme’
reactive end of the spectrum, the investigation of an individual offence might result in the
arrest and charge of a suspect, without any attempts being made to link him to other
offences. In contrast to these scenarios of ‘pure’ proactive and reactive work, however, the
large majority of investigations – particularly of crimes such as burglary which tend to be
committed by prolific offenders – fall at some point between the two ends of the spectrum,
and thus combine elements of both.
A successful investigation may therefore be one in which a piece of reactive work – for
example, obtaining a witness description of a suspect – provides the impetus for what
then becomes a wider operation targeting a known local offender. Or, conversely, where
a pre-existing proactive operation finally bears fruit, with evidence emerging from a crime
scene that is sufficient for an arrest and charge. The cases described in Boxes 3.1 and
3.2, below, illustrate the interplay between proactive and reactive investigative work.
Box 3.1: Young offender Steven L-
Between 2 and 30 September 2001, 11 burglaries with similar MOs had been
reported in the S- area of Tryton. All were ‘creeper burglaries’, involving entry through
insecure windows or doors while the occupants were asleep14, and the theft of small
items such as mobile telephones. Fingerprints were recovered from the points of entry at
some of the scenes.
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14 ‘Creeper burglary’ is a term typically used by the police in this and other forces to describe an offence carried
out while the occupant is at home.
Detectives had no idea about possible suspects, and hence decided to mount foot patrols
of the S- area between the hours of 11 pm and 3 am. On the first night of patrolling (1
October), officers stopped and searched five young people who were seen at the end of
an alley. As they were carrying screwdrivers and gloves, the youngsters were arrested for
‘going equipped’.
From interviews with the suspects the following day, police learnt that their ring-leader
was 16-year-old Steven L-, who had one previous conviction for burglary dating back 18
months and was currently in the care of social services. He denied having committed any
of the recent burglaries, and was released on police bail having provided a set of
elimination fingerprints.
From 4 to 13 October six similar offences were reported in the S- area. During this
period, Steven was arrested for three of the local burglaries on the basis of witness
descriptions of the suspect. He denied these offences and was bailed pending an identity
parade. On 13 October he was arrested again, as fingerprint matches came back for
four of the S- area offences, which he nevertheless denied. He was charged on 14
October and given conditional bail. Two days later he was arrested yet again, after a
plastic bag containing items taken from a burglary on 24 September was found in the
garden of a house in which he had previously stayed. 
When interviewed about the latter offence he admitted to the other four for which he had
already been charged, and to a further 13 which he asked to be TIC’d. He co-operated
fully with the police: for example, indicating places (mostly in woodland) where he had
left stolen property. He was released on bail pending sentence.
From late December, police again began to receive reports of ‘creeper burglaries’ in the
S- area. In mid-January, the victim of one of the burglaries reported that he had
confronted Steven, who he had known to be a burglar, and persuaded him to return what
he had stolen. Steven was arrested for this offence on 19 January, denied it, and was
released on police bail into the care of social services (pending further investigation). The
police learnt (through intelligence) two days later that Steven was sleeping rough, and
believed him to be responsible for the theft of some food from a day centre near to where
he was thought to be sleeping. At the time of the case study research, officers were
looking for Steven.
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Box 3.2: Targeting suspect Paul S-
Paul S-, a 29-year-old heroin user, was known to the police in Tryton. He had previous
convictions for theft of motor vehicles, shoplifting and burglary. In the autumn of 2001 police
noticed that burglaries in a specific area of Tryton were increasing, and were linked to Paul
by a DC on the grounds that the MO, the targeted area and the types of goods stolen were
similar to those associated with Paul’s previous burglary convictions. However, Paul was
initially discounted as a suspect because he was believed to be serving a prison sentence.
Enquiries with the prison service then revealed that Paul had in fact been released. 
In September 2001 a burglary occurred (B.1) and a witness provided a description of
the suspect which appeared to match Paul. One aspect of the description was that the
suspect was said to have a ponytail, and the DC recalled that Paul had had a ponytail
when he had dealt with him three or four years previously. He contacted the prison
service to ask if Paul had had a ponytail when in prison, and learnt that he had. The
police had no address for Paul, but established that he was still with a girlfriend known to
them as a heroin user.
Paul was arrested at his girlfriend’s address in early October, on suspicion of B.1. His
property was searched and goods seized, including a watch believed to have come from
another burglary (B.2). Paul was interviewed about B.1 and B.2, and charged with the
latter, which he denied (the former was taken no further). He was released on bail, and the
DC then began to research all burglaries in the area to see if some could be linked to Paul. 
Two weeks later Paul was arrested on suspicion of a burglary (B.3) from which there was
fingerprint evidence. He denied the offence, and was charged and released on
conditional bail. Over the following weeks the number of burglaries in the area in which
Paul was thought to operate subsided, and then began to rise again. 
On 3 December, DCs asked patrol officers to check if Paul was complying with his bail
conditions, and found that he was breaching his 7 pm to 8 am curfew. He was arrested
and charged with breach of his bail conditions (which he admitted), and items were
found on his person that were thought to have come from a burglary committed earlier
that day (B.4). Paul denied B.4, stating that he had bought these items that morning from
a man in the street. He was charged and remanded in custody.
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Shortly thereafter, Paul was arrested for a further two burglaries (B.5 and B. 6 –
committed on 30 November and 2 December) on the basis of witness descriptions of the
suspect. Following identification parades, at which he was identified, he was charged
with these offences. At the time of the case study research, the police were hoping that he
would change his pleas to guilty and request TICs with respect to other offences. He was
believed to be responsible for up to 40 recent offences in the area. 
The close interrelationship between proactive and reactive investigative work seems to be
taken for granted by police officers directly involved in the investigation of burglary. From the
focus groups for officers, organised as part of this study, it emerged that the kind of
intelligence-led, offender-focused work that is described as ‘proactive’ in the research literature
is in fact often regarded by officers simply as an important dimension of ‘reactive’ work. The
officers in the focus groups themselves used the term ‘proactive’ in other ways: in some cases,
to refer mainly to preventive work such as target-hardening and high visibility patrolling and, in
other cases, to refer specifically to surveillance work (rather than to offender-focused
investigative activity in general). That there is confusion within the police generally over the
very definition of proactivity was stressed by one of the officers, who commented: 
Proactive is the most over-used and most misunderstood word in the police service. Now,
I’ve caught myself using it lots of times, thinking – what do you really mean by proactive?
It’s over-used, misunderstood and can cover any number of contingencies, really.
Interdependence
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that, in the investigation of burglary, proactive
work (using the term, as in much research literature, to refer to offender-based investigation) is in
general not simply intertwined with but is in fact dependent on reactive work. This is because
reactive work generally provides the leads and evidence to be used in detaining the targeted
offenders – as well as, very often, the rationale for targeting the offenders in the first instance.
At the same time, good reactive work in a sense depends on proactivity, since the police may
respond to individual incidents most thoroughly and effectively when operating within a
broad proactive framework. In all three fieldwork sites, officers commented on the fact that
the initial reporting of burglaries by uniformed staff was often poor. It was frequently argued
that one of the causes of this was the tendency for reporting to be carried out as if it was an
isolated, largely administrative task. This suggests that problems of poor reporting might at
least partially be overcome if the initial investigations of individual burglaries are seen as
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crucial and integral elements of a wider process of disrupting criminals and preventing crime.
(The subject of police reporting of burglary offences will be further considered in Chapter 4).
Public service is an important element of reactive police work, in that officers necessarily deal
closely with victims and, in some cases, witnesses in responding to burglary offences. This again
highlights the interdependence of reactive and proactive work, since the kinds of information
that may be forthcoming from the victim or witness of an offence can prove valuable not only to
the investigation of that specific crime, but also to any subsequent or ongoing proactive
investigation15. Most broadly, ‘satisfying victims can assist good relations with the public’, and,
in turn, promote the flow of intelligence from the public to the police (Gill et al., 1996: 1). The
satisfaction of victims can depend on various factors, including the manner of officers dealing
with the offence, their promptness and thoroughness in responding to it, the outcome of the
investigation, and the recovery of stolen property (Coupe and Griffiths, 1996). 
There is undoubtedly a close relationship between proactive investigative work and crime
prevention. (The latter is also commonly included within the umbrella term ‘proactive policing’
– both in the research literature and, as noted above, by officers themselves.) In relation to
the policing of burglary, Bridgeman and Taylor-Browne observe that ‘the distinction between
proactive and preventive work becomes blurred when, for example, aspects of crime pattern
analysis and repeat victimisation measures are included’ (1996: 27). This point is made also
by Maguire and John, who describe an integrated and holistic approach to proactive
policing (adopted by one of the forces they studied) which was explicitly
not restricted to operations against individual offenders, but … embrace[d] the
broader aims of crime prevention and reduction. To this end, a ‘Crime Reduction
Officer’ was attached to the Intelligence Unit, with a brief, aided by the crime
analyst, to identify current or likely future crime problems in the area and to devise
preventive or ‘disruptive’ strategies to tackle them (1995: 45).
The integration of reactive and proactive policing?
As has been mentioned above, Maguire and John’s study found that organisational reform is
required in order to enhance substantially the role of proactive policing. Wider recognition –
on the part of senior managers and policy-makers – of the interrelationship between proactive
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15 A national evaluation of the police interviewing model PEACE found some serious weaknesses in police
interviewing of victims and witnesses. The police interviews were typically characterised as displaying poor
rapport and being driven by closed or leading questions. This suggests that a great deal of potential intelligence
is being lost (Clarke and Milne, 2002).
and reactive investigative work, and indeed between investigation and crime reduction, may
make this process of reform easier to achieve. In line with this, simplistic assumptions about
the inherent superiority of proactive over reactive policing should be avoided.
In other words, enhancing proactivity should not be regarded or presented as a matter of
introducing entirely new ways of working, or rejecting the core components of ‘traditional’
reactive police work. Rather, it should be seen as a shift in emphasis which places
increasing weight on the proactive aspects of police investigations and, simultaneously, on
those elements of reactive policing on which successful proactive work depends.
Accordingly, one of the main challenges of organisational reform should be to identify and
establish mechanisms by which reactive policing can most productively feed into, rather
than divert attention away from, the targeting of prolific offenders. 
This kind of understanding of proactive and reactive approaches as complementary rather
than competing should help to diminish any cultural resistance to change within the police –
since it ties in closely with officers’ own perceptions of what the process of investigating
crime necessarily entails. Obviously, given the existence of alternative definitions of the very
term ‘proactivity’ within the police, such developments demand greater conceptual clarity
and perhaps the evolution of more precise concepts and terms.
The development and implementation of the National Intelligence Model indicates that
strategic thinking within the police is indeed moving on from the reactive-proactive dichotomy.
(Whether this is true also of policy debate on policing is less clear.) The NIM does not
explicitly address the relationship between reactive and proactive policing, but running
through it is the assumption that effective policing is dependent on the thorough integration of
intelligence-led, proactive work within all dimensions of policing activity. For example, the
concept of the ‘tactical tasking and co-ordination group’ is a core component of the model.
This meeting is expected to be held weekly or fortnightly and to be attended by the
intelligence manager, crime analysts and middle managers with operational responsibilities.
Among other roles, it should monitor and encourage progress on the following four
dimensions of police activity, which clearly bring together reactive and proactive work:
 targeting offenders in line with the priorities of the control strategy
 the management of crime and disorder hot spots
 the investigation of crimes and incidents which can be shown to be linked into
‘series’
 the application of the range of ‘preventative measures’ such as CCTV and lighting
schemes or community action initiatives (NCIS, 2000: 14).
The Reducing Burglary Initiative: investigating burglary
26
4 Routine
This chapter and the two that follow develop and consider three general principles that
should guide the investigation of burglary: namely routine, simplicity and flexibility. These
principles are derived from careful analysis of the case study investigations, and the
interviewed officers’ own assessments of what works well – and badly – in an investigation.
Most importantly, they build on the recognition that the investigation of burglary is
necessarily a complex, multi-layered process involving a constant interplay between reactive
and proactive work. 
The importance of routine
Precisely because investigation tends to be complex and messy, the adoption of systematic
procedures with respect to key elements of the process is vital. Without elements of routine,
the risks are that investigative work will lack accountability and ownership, and that there
will be many inconsistencies in the kinds and extent of tasks carried out. Hence the
organisation and management of burglary investigation must strike a difficult balance
between establishing clear parameters for key investigative activities, and granting
investigating officers sufficient flexibility and independence. 
This chapter discusses the broad issue of routine as it relates to certain aspects of burglary
investigation. In particular, the focus will be on initial investigative procedures; the process
of allocating cases for further investigation; mechanisms for pooling information about
offences and offenders within the police; and systems of communication between the police
and other agencies.
Initial investigative work
The part of burglary investigation that can most easily be routinised is the initial stage:
that is, from the point that the police are first notified of the offence through to
attendance (if required) by scenes of crime officers (SOCOs). The handling of an initial
call about an offence from a member of the public is itself part of the investigative
process and thus
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call takers, whether police officers or civilians working in communications centres,
crime desks or enquiry desks, must have the availability to obtain all relevant
information in a professional and courteous manner …, and they must be able to
record details accurately in the prescribed format (ACPO, 2002: 15).
Once the police have been notified of a burglary, there are a range of relatively
straightforward and standard operational procedures that can be carried out in every case16.
The details of these procedures vary between forces and between policing areas within
forces; but whatever the local policy is, there should be clarity on the following issues:
 the maximum period within which a burglary should be attended after the police
have been informed of the offence;
 which officers initially attend the scene: for example, uniformed reactive staff,
dedicated burglary officers, detectives17; 
 whether a statement is routinely taken from the victim during the initial visit to the scene;
 the time-scale and extent of house-to-house enquiries to be carried out by the
reporting officer; 
 the process by which details of stolen property are recorded (for example, a
property list may be left for the victim to complete);
 the procedure for obtaining and submitting elimination fingerprints; and
 whether SOCOs are routinely requested to attend every dwelling burglary, or
only where certain criteria are met.
Officers interviewed for this study were aware of the importance of routine in early
investigation, and attempts had been made to standardise procedures in all the field-work
sites. The implementation of these, however, appeared to be somewhat problematic. In
particular it was suggested that the officers responsible for carrying out the initial scene visits
(for the most part, uniformed, reactive staff) often completed their duties inadequately: that is,
they typically failed to undertake some of the prescribed tasks (such as house-to-house
enquiries), recorded only the most sketchy of details on the standard reporting forms or
‘burglary packs’, or recorded details inaccurately. The risks inherent in this can hardly be
overstated: given that immediate leads from burglary scenes tend to be the most valuable
source of detections, poor reporting can have very negative repercussions. This point is
stressed by Gill et al., whose study found that ‘the most significant contributory factor to a
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16 See the ACPO investigation manual for an outline of the actions that should be taken by the first officer who
attends a crime scene (ACPO, 2002).
17 The Audit Commission (1993) argues that the initial visit to a burglary should ideally be carried out by a
specialist scene visit officer or detective, to avoid the duplication of effort that results when several visits are paid
to the same scene by different officers. Following from the Audit Commission suggestions, Taylor and Hirst
(1995) examine the effectiveness of using specialists to carry out burglary scene visits.
successful [burglary] investigation is the first investigator’s crime report. The quality of the
actions taken and recorded bears greatly upon the successful resolution of a case’ (1998: 15). 
These problems appear to stem partly from the fact that crime reporting is sometimes treated as
a task that is isolated from the broader investigative work of the police. Problems with reporting
are apparently also caused by the severe time pressures on officers, who tend to be pushed by
command and control centres to complete each task as quickly as possible, so that they can
move on to the next one. This latter problem demonstrates the difficulties that can arise when
different performance measures employed by a particular force, or different demands made on
officers, effectively contradict each other in the context of limited staffing resources. In this case,
the expectation that officers undertake a range of tasks at each crime scene is undermined by
the demand for prompt responses to calls for attendance. It is thus vital that force policy with
respect to crime reporting is informed by a holistic view of the work involved: that is, that the
various elements of the system are treated as integrated rather than independent parts.
The shortcomings associated with the reporting of burglaries illustrate that, in itself, having
appropriate systematic procedures enshrined in policy is not enough. For these procedures
to be implemented, staff must be fully aware of what they are and have the necessary
training to be able to carry them out properly; working practices must be organised in such
a way that officers have sufficient time to do what is required of them; and systems for
thorough supervision and review of reporting officers’ work must be in place18.
Crime screening
Crime screening is the process by which serious cases are allocated to CID officers, less serious
(or straightforward) cases go to uniformed officers, and cases with a low chance of detection
are placed on file. Crime screening ensures that costly detective effort is ‘concentrated on cases
which are very important or where there is a likelihood but not a certainty of success’ (Sinclair
and Miller, 1984: 27). It is a practice that has emerged out of ‘economic stringency, and the
growing understanding that investigative performance is not simply a product of the resources
made available to this task’ (Burrows and Tarling, 1987: 248)19. 
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18 In an effort to minimise inconsistencies in the reporting of burglaries, in March 2001 Chiltern Vale police appointed a
civilian to ‘audit’ the burglary packs produced by reporting officers. The auditor ensures that all the necessary details
from each burglary scene are on file, and returns any pack he deems to be incomplete to the reporting officer.
19 It is interesting to note that Gill et al. favour the term ‘crime allocation’ over ‘crime screening’, on the grounds
that ‘crime should be assessed and allocated the most appropriate form of investigation, not screened in or out
of the investigative process’ (1996: 2). These researchers emphasise the concept of ‘static investigation’, which
‘enables investigations to continue beyond the point when active enquiries have cases and facilitates the
integration of information on crimes from all incidents’ (1996: 20).
The process of crime screening as applied to the investigation of burglary is known to vary
widely between policing areas. Indeed, the details of the practice differed between the three
fieldwork sites (see Appendix A); in all three, however, dwelling burglary cases that were
believed to offer some chance of detection tended to go to CID officers. Non-dwelling
burglaries, in contrast, were generally investigated by uniformed officers. 
Among the three sites, the process of crime screening in Oxford appeared to be the most
systematic. Here, all packs resulting from initial visits to burglary scenes were routinely and
quickly passed to the area’s dedicated burglary team. One of the officers in the team with
responsibility for the relevant geographic area of Oxford would then examine the burglary
pack, and it would be filed only once the officer had decided that there was no more that
could be done with it at that time. Given the regular briefings and communication between
members of the burglary team, this decision would be taken in the context of a general
awareness of any patterns in current offences. 
In both Chiltern Vale and Coventry, in contrast, there appeared to be less scope for detailed
case-by-case assessment. This was probably a consequence of the time pressures on officers.
Coventry did not have a burglary team and lacked its full complement of CID officers. Chiltern
Vale did have a burglary team but it was evidently under-resourced; here, therefore, cases for
which there were no obvious leads tended to be filed without first being examined by the team.
The benefits of a more systematic process of crime screening are not simply that the activities of
investigating officers are most likely to be focused on appropriate cases. In addition,
accountability for the investigation of individual cases should be enhanced, as should a sense of
ownership of investigative work among those responsible for it. A systematic process should also
ensure that broad force policies on the prioritisation of offences for investigation are reflected in
the practices of officers. As pointed out by Stockdale and Gresham, however, the process of
crime screening is inevitably shaped by a variety of factors: ‘The criteria which determine the
extent of an investigation need to be explicit and consistent, but their application will reflect
individual circumstances, local community priorities and resource levels’ (1995: 62).
Pooling information
The need for information
Successful investigation of burglary often depends on officers having an overview of what is
happening within the geographical area for which they have responsibility. With respect to
the investigation of volume crime generally, the ACPO manual notes that:
The Reducing Burglary Initiative: investigating burglary
30
Officers should be mindful of the need to research other crimes occurring in the same
area, including the modus operandi, point of entry and exit, escape routes, time and
day of offence, stolen/damaged property, recovered and abandoned property,
descriptions and details of any suspects and vehicles used etc. Scene linking can
lead to the development of the offender’s profile to alert other officers who may
know, suspect, or sight the offenders when they visit similar crimes or carrying out
general patrol duties. It may also be possible to task informants … to ascertain the
identity of an offender (2002: 29).
Basic information on burglary offences in a given area can be most easily brought together
if a single individual has responsibility for attending most of the scenes. This was the
practice in one part of the Chiltern Vale policing area, where a dedicated burglary officer –
a Police Constable – carried out the reporting of most offences. In Coventry, during the
period of the SDP, a civilian ‘scene assessor’ was employed to visit all burglary scenes
approximately one day after the initial report was taken. The role of the scene assessor was
to talk in more detail to victims, and thereby gather any further information about the
offences that might have come to light since the original police visit. Both the Chiltern Vale
burglary officer and Coventry scene assessor were in a position to draw initial inferences
about links between offences, which they could then pass on to investigating officers; in so
doing, they were perceived by their colleagues to be providing valuable contributions to the
investigation process20. 
In most areas, the number of offences to be reported and the consequent demands on staff
time are such that it is not feasible to have a single officer visit most burglary scenes. The
use of dedicated officers to visit crime scenes might, however, be worth considering in
particular contexts: for example, if there is a need to identify series of offences in order to
tackle an emerging burglary ‘hot-spot’.
Successful investigation of burglary depends not only on the pooling of information
about offences, but also on the availability of intelligence about offenders. Where
officers have shared knowledge about offenders’ typical MOs, their appearance, where
they are living, with whom they associate and so on, they are well placed to link
offences to individuals. In many cases, useful intelligence about offenders may emerge
primarily through effective communication with other agencies – as will be further
considered below.
31
Routine
20 To the disappointment of many officers in Coventry, the scene assessor post was discontinued at the end of the
SDP, as no alternative funding for it was available.
The pooling of information among police officers clearly demands an openness that does
not necessarily come easily. Policing research has frequently found that open exchange of
information is hindered by various aspects of police culture. Cope (2002), for example,
notes that within the police the holding of information is closely associated with power, with
the result that there is little sharing of primary information. Similarly, P. Gill observes that: 
In policing, where information is the pre-eminent means to status, the tendency of
officers to keep information to themselves has been well-established and represents a
central challenge for attempts to establish more formal and corporate systems of
intelligence (2000: 164).
Systems of information exchange
Notwithstanding any existing cultural barriers to information exchange, in all three
fieldwork sites it was evident that formal systems of briefings – that is, routine verbal,
written and intranet briefings – ensured that there was a constant flow of information
relevant to the investigation of burglary. Exactly how these systems operated varied
according to the policing structures in place; but in each site efforts were made to
ensure full and regular communication between uniformed officers, CID officers,
intelligence departments, crime analysts and SOCOs. For example, normal practice in
Oxford – which worked well, according to officers – was that the burglary team had a
full briefing at 8.15 am every morning to discuss all burglaries over the past 24 hours.
Once a week, the team met with SOCOs, area intelligence and source management to
discuss the past week’s offences, burglary figures, and the release of offenders from
custody. Additionally, every Friday the burglary team sergeant produced a document
summarising the team’s activities over the past week, to be distributed to all Oxford
officers by email or in hard copy.
Complementing the briefing systems, each of the fieldwork sites had its own electronic
databases from which information of various kinds could be accessed by officers involved
in burglary investigation. Effective investigation clearly depends on information being
entered accurately, routinely and promptly on the relevant databases, as well as on
individual officers’ knowledge of precisely which information is available where, and the
ease with which they can access it. Hence the systems must be user-friendly, and officers
trained to use them. There were some concerns in one or two of the fieldwork sites that the
complexity of the respective information systems limited their usefulness to officers. In
particular, officers who had not been fully trained, or generally lacked confidence in using
computers, were thought to face difficulties because custody records, intelligence reports,
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individual offence reports, and crime and control logs (not to mention the more
sophisticated systems used by crime analysts) generally had to be accessed through
different systems21.
Notwithstanding the crucial importance to successful burglary investigation of regular
information exchange and access to electronic information systems, the potential problem of
information overload within the police should not be overlooked. Ideally, information
systems should be geared to communicating information of the appropriate level of detail to
the appropriate groups of investigating officers – whether these officers are defined in terms
of their geographic area of responsibility or the crime type (such as burglary) in which they
specialise. Berry (2000) has pointed out that in the police service vast quantities of
information tend to be distributed without an assessment of precisely who needs it and for
what purposes, which results in much wastage of time and resources. With increasing
computerisation this problem can only become more severe, as is noted by Ericson and
Haggerty, writing of the Canadian police service:
Communication technology fosters the production of more knowledge. The new
knowledge produced is often useful to the police …, but there is also a lot of
knowledge that is of tangential or dubious value (1997: 418).
The solution to information overload, notes Berry (2000), is for officers to identify their
information needs, with reference not only to the kind of information they require, but also
its depth and detail, level of accuracy, frequency, speed, and format. 
Inter-agency communication
Some of the case study investigations examined for this project pointed to the importance of
information exchange between policing areas and police forces in addition to more localised
communication. For example, some offenders who were being targeted were simultaneously
committing burglaries in more than one police area, and hence the police investigations
benefited from co-ordination between the different areas. In other cases, co-operation between
forces in different parts of the country was required, as offenders were already on bail for
offences committed elsewhere at the time they came to the attention of local officers. In one
case, information was acquired from another force about an offender’s previous burglary
convictions, which was then used in pressing charges on the basis of similar fact evidence. 
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21 Other research, such as that of Stockdale and Gresham (1995) has pointed to ongoing problems associated
with the use of information technology in police forces, and the need for greater standardisation of systems
between and within forces and better training provision for officers.
In addition to communication between policing areas and police forces, information
exchange between the police and other agencies can also play a vital part in burglary
investigation, as a range of agencies may have dealings with a particular suspect or
offender. Systems should thus be in place to ensure that certain kinds of information are
routinely and formally passed between agencies. 
Over the course of the fieldwork, the researchers came across several examples of apparent
breakdowns in communication between the probation and prison services and the police.
Most notably, perhaps, in at least two cases – those described in Box 3.2 and Box 4.1 –
investigative work was hindered by the fact that the police officers involved lacked
information about prison releases. In both cases, a possible suspect was initially discounted
because he was wrongly believed to be in custody. 
The police in all the three fieldwork sites were, however, confident that communication between
themselves and the prison service had improved, such that they were now routinely being
informed of prison releases. In West Midlands Police, for example, there was a new system
under which this information went directly to the Community Safety Bureau (CSB) in the relevant
Operational Command Unit (such as Coventry) as well as to force headquarters. Of course, to
make the most of information on prison releases, systems of internal communication within the
police – as discussed above – must ensure that it is passed on to the relevant departments or
officers. Hence, in Coventry, information about prison releases was passed from the CSB to the
local intelligence officer in the relevant sector, who would enter it in the briefing system.
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Box 4.1: Prolific burglar Simon E-
In early 2000 the police in Senham identified similarities between burglaries being
committed in a specific area of the city. In each case, the offender used a small stone to
break glass in windows adjacent to front door latches; the burgled properties tended to
be well-presented end-of-terrace houses; the breaks occurred during the day; and similar
property was stolen. 
Liaison between the CID, intelligence, and SOCOs took place. A possible suspect by the
name of Simon E- was suggested on the basis that the MO of the current series seemed to
match the MO of burglaries for which he had previously been convicted in Senham.
(Simon was 29 years old and had 20 previous convictions for 44 offences.) However,
Senham police were of the belief that he was currently serving out a prison sentence, and
his name was therefore discounted. 
Several days later a DC who had previously dealt with Simon saw him by chance in the
city centre. The officer submitted an intelligence log stating that Simon was out of prison;
this fact was then noted by the officers who had been dealing with the offences described
above. Simon was subsequently arrested and charged with several of the burglaries on
fingerprint evidence. He was eventually convicted of three burglaries, with 16 burglaries
and five attempted burglaries TIC’d. 
In Coventry, efforts had also recently been made to improve communication between the
local magistrates’ court and the police. The CSB were now informed daily by fax of every
suspect who had been given conditional bail by the court. On the basis of this information,
shift officers were tasked to visit every suspected burglar who had been conditionally
bailed, to check for compliance with the conditions.
Failures to inform the police of prison releases were not the only examples of serious
communication breakdown contained in the case studies reviewed for this project. In the
case of Sam P-, as described in Box 2.1, the probation service did not tell the police that
this highly prolific burglar had been discharged from his DTTO for breaching its conditions,
and placed in a bail hostel. Similarly, in the case of Graeme T- (see Box 4.2), the police
were on two occasions not informed by probation staff that this suspect had left his bail
hostel in breach of his bail conditions. Such cases, which highlight the prolific and persistent
nature of much offending, point to the crucial importance of inter-agency co-operation in
managing and reviewing the behaviour of suspects after arrest – for example, through
rigorous enforcement of bail conditions and community sentences.
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Box 4.2: Breaches of bail conditions by suspected burglar Graeme T-
In Middleton in early October 2001, 28-year-old Graeme T- was arrested and charged
with burglary and possession of an offensive weapon. Although the police requested a
remand in custody, he was bailed by magistrates to a drug treatment centre outside
Middleton. On 20 October, a few days after entering the centre, he was discharged
because he had breached his bail conditions by going out the day before to meet and go
drinking with friends. 
On being discharged, Graeme was allowed to leave the centre alone. According to staff
at the centre, they had informed the probation service of Graeme’s discharge, and
expected probation to pass on this information to the police. Probation staff, however,
subsequently stated that they had not received any such message. Whatever the cause of
this breakdown in communication, the result was that the police did not know that Graeme
had been discharged from the centre until they learnt through intelligence the next day that
he was back in Middleton. Had they been informed promptly, they would have sought to
arrest him for breaching his bail conditions prior to his departure from the centre.
Having been located through intelligence, within two days of leaving the centre Graeme
was arrested and charged with breaching his bail conditions and a further burglary. He
was subsequently bailed to another drug treatment centre. On 16 November, after
having spent two weeks at the centre, he breached his bail conditions by walking out;
again the police were not informed of this. Ten days later he was re-arrested and then
charged with breaching his bail conditions and with burgling a pub on 18 November. 
The importance of inter-agency communication about offenders and suspects illustrates that
partnership working can be a crucial aspect of investigative work as well as other aspects
of crime reduction. What is more, this is an example of how partnership can play a
concrete and highly functional role – in contrast to many situations in which the concept of
partnership is somewhat abstract or is associated more with strategic or policy discussions
than with the daily operations of agencies. However, the examples of communication
breakdown between agencies in the fieldwork sites point to the fact that establishing systems
for inter-agency information exchange can be difficult. At a pragmatic level, simple
carelessness or inaccurate recording of information can have major repercussions; and, at a
more fundamental level, concerns about how information will be used by other agencies
can hinder communication and cause severe tensions between supposed partners (see, for
example, HMIC, 2000; Phillips et al., 2002).
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5 Simplicity
It has been argued above that the process of investigating burglary tends to be complex, as a
consequence of, in essence, the multiplicity of offences and multiplicity of offenders that must
be dealt with. Perhaps paradoxically, the findings of this study suggest that simplicity should
nevertheless be one of the principles that guide the police response to burglary offences.
Simple responses to burglary should nevertheless be informed responses. However simple
they may be, actions taken by the police need to be knowledge-based – that is, based on
generalised criminological knowledge of the kinds of police activities that can be expected
to yield results, styles and methods of offending, and patterns of victimisation22, as well as
on specific knowledge of local offences and offenders.
In advocating simplicity – or, more precisely, ‘informed simplicity’ – the intention here is to
stress that the police can often achieve positive results by taking relatively straightforward
steps in terms of analysis and investigation. Simplicity is about ensuring that the basic, core
elements of an investigation are carried out, and are carried out properly. If the basics are
done well, an investigation may well come to a speedy and successful conclusion; or, in the
absence of a successful outcome, any further or subsequent investigative work will have a
solid grounding on which to build.
Simple investigative work can achieve results because few burglars are highly
sophisticated in their methods. As many of the officers interviewed for this study pointed
out, burglars tend to be opportunistic offenders, who are very often committing crime in
order to fund drug habits, and frequently do not make much effort to, or are physically and
mentally not able to, hide their tracks effectively. In the words of one of the police
participants in a focus group:
Burglars are not clever people – mostly they’re desperate people, just desperate to
get their next fix, and so it shouldn’t be beyond us to put an end to their [offences]
after two or three.
This chapter will discuss, in turn, the principle of simplicity in relation to investigative
actions, informal communication, and crime analysis.
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22 See Ekblom (2002) for a discussion of the obstacles that stand in the way of the transfer of criminological
knowledge to mainstream policing practice.
Investigative actions
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are certain procedures that should, as a
minimum, be carried out as standard in the initial stage of a burglary investigation. Beyond
these actions, if any additional steps are to be taken by investigating officers, relatively
simple avenues of enquiry may often prove rewarding.
This is not to suggest that every case should be pursued beyond the initial investigative
stage. Rather, the argument here is that in some cases – which should be identified through
a system of crime screening – officers may find it worthwhile to undertake certain quick and
easy actions over and above the minimum required of every investigation. Moreover, given
the interdependence of reactive and proactive work, even if these actions fail to produce
immediate results, they might generate useful intelligence that can be used in subsequent
targeting of offenders.
Tracing stolen property
An example of the kind of simple investigative action that can be highly productive is the
following up of known routes of disposal of stolen property. Coupe and Griffiths (1996)
point out that although property was stolen in 87 per cent of the cases of burglary they
examined, it ‘rarely featured as the key factor in solving a case’, and suggest that greater
use of stolen property as a means of detecting burglaries could be beneficial. Osterburg
and Ward note the importance of recording details of all items stolen in a burglary,
including those that were perhaps overlooked when the initial crime report was taken, since
‘in even the smallest burglary there is likely to be something taken that has a number or
mark that individualises it for identification purposes’ (2000: 525). Stolen property that is
subsequently recovered ‘may provide the link that helps solve the case’ (2000: 516)23.
Ideally, efforts to trace stolen property should be linked with multi-agency strategies to
disrupt local markets in stolen goods, such as those described by Sutton et al. (2001). (This
provides another example of the potential role of partnership in investigative work.)
Among the fieldwork sites of this study, Oxford appeared to be the most committed to
tracing stolen property: for example by contacting second-hand shops to which local
offenders were known to bring certain kinds of stolen items. The example presented in Box
5.1, involving police visits to a pawnshop frequently used to dispose of stolen jewellery,
illustrates the potential of this approach.
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23 The ACPO manual on investigating volume crime (2002) also emphasises the importance of recording full
details of stolen property and tracing these items.
Box 5.1: Tracing jewellery stolen by Tim P-
About £10,000-worth of jewellery was stolen from a house in Middleton on 3 October,
2001 (B.1). On 4 October, as part of their investigation, detectives visited a local
pawnshop with the victim, who identified as her own some items that had been pawned
the day before. (These officers routinely call the pawnbroker when jewellery is stolen, to
enquire about recent transactions.) The shop’s records showed that the items had been
pawned by a woman giving her name as Sandra K, and CCTV footage showed that she
had been accompanied by a male, identified by a shop employee as Tim P-.
On 5 October Sandra was arrested and made a full statement – telling officers that Tim,
a friend of a friend, had asked her to pawn the jewellery on his behalf, as he had
reached his limit in the shop. She also said that he had come back to her the following
day (4 October) with more jewellery to pawn, and again they had visited the shop
together (very shortly after the police had paid their own visit to the shop, it transpired).
Sandra was released without charge.
Tim was also arrested on 5 October, having been found by the police (through
intelligence) in a taxi. That evening he was charged with B.1, and made no comment in
interview. The Fingerprint Bureau was asked to check his fingerprints against prints found
at the scene of B.1 and at the scene of another local burglary, committed on 31
September (B.2). On 16 October fingerprint matches came back for both offences. Tim
admitted to having carried out B.2 when arrested for it on 21 October.
In response to Sandra’s comment that she had visited the pawnshop on a second
occasion with Tim (on 4 October), police subsequently went back to the pawnshop and
seized its records and video footage of this visit. The jewellery pawned on this occasion
was later traced to a burglary committed on the morning of 4 October (B.3), which Tim
admitted and asked to be TIC’d along with 17 other burglaries.
Identifying suspects
Some investigative actions can quickly reveal a suspect’s identity. For example, a careful or
extensive effort to contact potential witnesses may be productive, given that, as Osterburg and
Ward point out, ‘although conventional wisdom holds that there are few witnesses to burglaries,
in reality there are likely to be many more than we would expect’ (2000: 515). They suggest
(as does the ACPO investigation manual) that attempts to locate witnesses to a burglary should
not be limited to neighbours, but should extend also to others who might have been at the scene
around the time of the offence: such as postmen, delivery men or utility meter readers. 
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In addition to speaking to possible witnesses, other simple actions can help to identify a suspect.
In the case study in Box 4.1, the offender was identified following a visit paid by the detective to
the local post office – an obvious first step in response to two closely related burglaries.
Box 5.2: ‘Postman’ burglar Patrick G-
In the morning of 2 May 2001, a resident of Middleton heard his post arrive and,
immediately afterwards, the window in his front porch being smashed. He ran to the front
door, and saw that his door keys were missing from the porch windowsill. He went
outside, where he saw the postman get on to his bicycle and cycle off. The resident
reported the incident to the police as a burglary (B.1).
The police later received a report from another Middleton resident of an attempted
burglary (B.2). It emerged that this had occurred 50 minutes after B.1, in the same area of
the city. On this occasion, the aggrieved had heard some loud bangs on his front door;
when he went to investigate he discovered his post lying on the doormat and that the front
door was open and its handle broken. He saw the postman outside, who said that he had
seen two youths running away from the house shortly after he had delivered the post.
The Middleton DC assigned to the two offences immediately linked them because of the
timings, locations and the fact that a postman was seen at both. He decided that his first
task was to interview the post office manager to obtain details of who was delivering
post in that area. It transpired that the postman, Patrick G-, had recently been employed
by the post office on a temporary basis. The DC recognised the name Patrick G-, and on
returning to the police station established (through a search of the intelligence database)
that he had previous convictions for burglary.
Patrick was arrested on 8 May, and subsequently charged with both B.1 and B.2 (which
he denied) and with obtaining pecuniary advantage by deception. This latter charge
related to a failure by Patrick to disclose his previous convictions when applying through
an employment agency for the temporary post office job. Patrick ultimately pleaded guilty
to B.1 and the deception offence, and received a 15-month prison sentence. 
In the course of some investigations, a breakthrough may result from what is apparently an
intuitive link made by an officer between an offence and a possible suspect. In the case of
Micky D-, for example (as presented in Box 5.3), an officer’s ‘hunch’ that property found in the
possession of a known burglar might have come from a particular burglary proved invaluable.
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What is often interpreted by detectives as ‘intuition’ may in fact be more accurately described
as an immediate insight borne out of previous experience and knowledge.
Box 5.3: Distraction burglary suspect Micky D-
On 24 September 2001, a Middleton DC dealt with a 93-year-old woman who had
reported a burglary. She was extremely confused, and unable to say what items had
been taken. She did comment, however, that she believed a man who had called on her
socially had stolen her property. Because of her level of confusion, the DC felt there was
little chance of making progress with this case.
Three days later, the DC learnt that Micky D- had just been arrested for drink driving, and
had been found with a large amount of property in his car, including a wall mirror, china
plates, and various ornaments. 56-year-old Micky was known to the police as he had
many past convictions for burglary, including distraction burglary, dating back to 1958.
Acting, in his own words, ‘on a hunch’, the detective took the property found in Micky’s
car to the address of the elderly burglary victim. Her daughters were visiting her at the
time, and were able to identify most of the property as her own. Micky was arrested and
charged with burglary, which he denied. However, he admitted having visited the victim,
and claimed that she had freely given him the property found in his car. At the time of the
case study research, this case was yet to go to trial.
Informal communication
The principle of simplicity can usefully be applied to communication between police officers.
The findings of the empirical research conducted for this study indicate that informal, direct
communication between officers can play a vital part in investigative work. The advantage
of this kind of communication – which is usually verbal and face-to-face, but can also be by
telephone or email – is that it potentially allows the most relevant information on a given
issue to be quickly and clearly exchanged between the officers for whom it has most
significance. Informal communication can be equally important within departments (for
example, when members of a burglary team discuss cases they are dealing with) and
between departments (for example, when information about a particular suspect is passed
between CID and uniformed officers, or between intelligence officers and sector CID).
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Past research has also highlighted the role of informal communication in investigative work:
the findings of Gill et al. (1998), for example, point to the importance of consultation with
colleagues in the process of burglary investigation. As part of a study by P. Gill (2000),
officers from Merseyside were asked how they receive information on targets and crime
patterns. The results, according to Gill, confirmed previous research findings that
information received informally from colleagues tends to be the most useful.
The importance of informal communication was repeatedly stressed by officers interviewed
for this study. Many stated a preference for verbal over written communication on account of
its brevity, directness and clarity – as in the following remark by a member of the Oxford
burglary team:
You can’t communicate through paper or computer systems. You communicate better
through people, and that’s what it comes down to … It’s not the same if you get
handed a piece of paper – you ain’t gonna read it, are you?
Despite officers’ concerns about information overload, and some apparent tendencies to
disregard written material, it is clear that informal communication is not a substitute for more
formalised methods of information exchange. Rather, the former should work best within a
context of properly implemented formal (written and verbal) briefings – as discussed above –
which can ensure that key individuals and items of information do not fall outside the loop of
informal consultations. It should also be noted that informal, person-to-person information
exchange has little value if it is not acted upon. Where useful information is produced through
casual discussions among officers about targets or offences, this information should either feed
into investigative activity, or be disseminated further through more formal mechanisms.
By definition, the nature and extent of informal communication cannot be determined by
policy. However, different working arrangements can promote or inhibit it, and should take
account of the kinds of cultural barriers to information exchange that can hinder informal just
as much as formal communication. P. Gill writes of the significance of ‘spatial’ means by which
the flow of information can be encouraged within the police. He notes that it can be beneficial
to locate the intelligence unit ‘where least effort is required on the part of uniformed patrol
officers and detectives to use it, for example, on their way to the canteen’ (2000: 164). This
point was made by officers involved in this project’s focus groups – for example:
“It starts with wedging the door open, basically … [so that] people can come in [to
the burglary team office], but just as importantly the officers from that team or squad
get out as well and spread the word.”
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Another participant remarked that ‘a flight of stairs, even a door, is a barrier [to
communication]’.
More fundamentally, perhaps, informal communication also depends on management and
working practices that help to break down social barriers between departments. As noted by
Maguire and Norris (1992), past research has often found that barriers exist between CID
and uniformed officers. Cope (2002) observes that civilian staff including crime analysts can
be isolated from their police colleagues.
Crime analysis
The increasing emphasis placed on proactive policing in recent years has led to a great
deal of interest in local crime analysis. The aim of local crime analysis is, broadly speaking,
to develop a detailed understanding of local patterns of crime in order to enhance the
police response to them (Read and Oldfield, 1995). As defined by HMIC, crime analysis
seeks to ‘marry together the various strands of offender profiling, linking of series of crimes,
analysis of trends and “hotspots” together with traditional target-hardening crime prevention
methods to provide an overall intelligence-driven response’ (1998: 4). The growing interest
in crime analysis has led to the appointment of dedicated crime analysts by police forces,
and the development of a range of computer packages to be used in mapping and
analysing offences and the locations and activities of offenders.
Crime analysis may have a particular part to play in the investigation of burglary. Osterburg
and Ward note that ‘the successful conclusion of a case will frequently depend on the
investigator’s ability to handle a large amount of seemingly unrelated pieces of information
in an analytical way’. They argue that there are various features of burglary investigations
that ‘lend themselves to crime analysis’, including the fact that many burglars are known to
the police, have previous convictions, operate within a specific area, commit a large
number of crimes, and leave behind ‘distinguishing marks’ such as type of property taken or
the kind of search undertaken (2000: 526).
It is therefore to be expected that various crime analysis software packages have been
developed for specific application to burglary. The burglary SDPs located in Chiltern Vale
and Coventry both made use of such packages – known as InvestigAide in the former and
the Cleveland System in the latter. These were intended to assist the detection of burglaries
by matching offences to possible suspects, essentially by analysing the MOs of the offences
and linking them to the MOs of known local burglars.
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In both sites, however, the crime analysis packages proved to be of limited use, and were
ultimately abandoned. The major problem in both cases seemed to be that the burglary
MOs were not sufficiently differentiated for the offences to be linked with any degree of
certainty to individual burglars (seemingly contradicting the assertion of Osterburg and
Ward about the ‘distinguishing marks’ associated with burglary offences)24. There were,
additionally, problems with the implementation of the system in Chiltern Vale – most notably
arising from the fact that it required the recording of a large amount of additional data from
burglary scenes by the reporting officers, who frequently did not have enough time, or
indeed the necessary motivation, to do so.
The scope of simple analysis
The difficulties faced in both Chiltern Vale and Coventry with respect to the crime analysis
packages indicate that careful consideration needs to be given to the precise levels of
analysis appropriate to the detection of burglary. In all three fieldwork sites, moreover,
police officers’ general comments about burglary investigations indicated that they broadly
favoured simple modes of analysis over the apparently more sophisticated techniques
offered by the InvestigAide, Cleveland and other systems employed by the crime analysts.
The evidence from the fieldwork sites suggests that simple analysis – which can take various
forms – can indeed produce good results. In many cases, this may involve little more than
plotting recent offences on a map to see if they are likely to have been, or could have been,
committed by the same individual or group; and consulting intelligence on known offenders
who may be in the area and their MOs. This is the kind of process that yielded results in the
examples described in Boxes 3.2 and 4.1. The assertion that more complex crime analysis
techniques are not required in order to identify a series of offences was strongly made by a
detective in one of the sites, who at the time of this research was working on a series of
burglaries committed in a particular area. When asked if the series had initially been
identified by a crime analyst, she replied sharply, ‘I have a maths degree and can spot a
series myself – quicker than the analyst’.
Among members of the Oxford burglary team, a basic tool used in analysing offences was
the burglary handbook. Each officer had a handbook, in which he manually entered details
(taken from crime reports) of every offence he dealt with, together with any additional
comments about the case based on his own knowledge or expectations. These books were
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24 This potential pitfall of crime analysis systems which target offenders has been noted by Read and Oldfield, who
argue that ‘with high volume crime, while there may be some MOs that are sufficiently uncommon to provide an
obvious link between offences and known offenders, in many cases the MO, or at least the way the MO is
recorded, is likely to be so common as to make case linking through this variable alone impossible’ (1995: 14).
frequently consulted by officers, who found them to be a useful and quick source of reference
to past offences, and hence an aid to spotting possible connections between crimes.
Another example of simple analysis was provided by the work of the Coventry scene
assessor. A Detective Chief Inspector in Coventry commented in interview on the scene
assessor’s capacity to identify crime patterns in ‘real time’ as he drew his own inferences
from the scenes he would visit one after another. This process of analysis was regarded as
all the more productive when combined with information and suggestions provided by local
intelligence officers and SOCOs.
Electronic crime analysis systems such as InvestigAide and the Cleveland System can
appear slow and cumbersome in comparison to the kinds of simple analysis carried out
manually or in the minds of officers, and often enhanced through informal consultation with
colleagues. Two focus group participants were particularly critical of what they regard as
slow, formal crime analysis:
If your system links up 20 or 30 burglaries as a series, then as an area you’ve failed.
Because 20 or 30 down the road, it might be another 20 or 30 until you’ve actually
got on top of it. Somebody somewhere should have seen that.
…My experience of IT systems is that they look beautiful, with all the colours, and it’s
got this and that, and man seen with a dog and all the rest of it, but you’re 30
burglaries into [the series] then, and you want to identify it when you’ve had three…
Beyond simple analysis
The simple forms of crime analysis apparently favoured by many officers in the case study
sites may certainly have an important part to play in the process of burglary investigation.
This is not to suggest, however, that the more sophisticated analytical tools cannot also be of
value. Simple analysis should perhaps best be seen as an important first stage in a great deal
of investigative work, on which more extensive analytical work can build wherever necessary.
Moreover, simple analysis can itself be problematic if there is over-dependence on it. Cope,
in her study of intelligence work within two police forces, distinguishes between information
produced by crime analysts and the kinds of ‘experiential knowledge’ on which the police
rely and which they acquire through their daily work. This experiential knowledge is
generally not recorded in any systematic fashion, but is stored only in officers’ heads. As
Cope points out,
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The difficulty with experiential knowledge is that if it is not passed on so that it can be
reviewed but is used to make decision about targeting police activity, it can lead to
policing-led intelligence, undermining the intelligence-led process (2002: 24).
The reservations voiced by officers about some of the work undertaken by crime analysts,
and the difficulties encountered in using the InvestigAide and Cleveland systems, do not
suggest that the potential value of crime analysis should be dismissed. The difficulties point to
problems that are commonly associated with the use and implementation of systems of
analysis rather to any inherent weakness in crime analysis as an investigative tool. According
to Cope, these problems include the poor quality of information with which crime analysts
often have to work; police officers’ lack of understanding of the process of crime analysis and
how it can support operational policing; the conflicting demands made on analysts, one
result of which is that they often provide descriptive rather than genuinely analytical products;
and the lack of acceptance of and recognition for analysts within police culture25.
The impact of new systems of crime analysis may be limited by the kinds of cultural constraints
which shape the use of all forms of new information technology within the police. Australian
research by Chan on information technology in policing found that although ‘officers are
beginning to appreciate the value of using technology-generated information for tactical and
strategic purposes’, policing continues to be dominated by ‘traditional policing styles and
values’ (2000: 156). Chan observed that those who designed new information technology
systems tended to view their potential application very differently to those who used them:
“Users of the technology, even the more advanced ones, expected it to make their work
easier and more efficient, without their having to change existing policing and management
styles. Architects of the systems, on the other hand, have intended the organization to move
towards a more sophisticated mode of information usage – for resource management,
tactical policing, strategic planning and policy decisions” (2000: 157).
It will be interesting to see to what extent the implementation of the National Intelligence
Model helps police forces to overcome the barriers to optimal use of intelligence and crime
analysis highlighted by researchers such as Cope and Chan. It is to be hoped that by
providing a framework within which intelligence work can be directed and its products
utilised, the NIM will help to achieve a greater synthesis between the work of crime analysts
and the activities – including the basic analytical activities – of operational police officers.
The Reducing Burglary Initiative: investigating burglary
46
25 Cope argues that analysts’ lack of recognition is partly to do with their civilian status but, more fundamentally,
also stems from the fact that police officers and analysts have very different approaches to understanding crime.
As noted above, police officers tend to acquire and rely on grounded, contextual ‘experiential knowledge’; in
contrast, crime data are ‘de-contextualised and sometimes de-personalised’ by the process of crime analysis: a
process which should be ‘reliable, verifiable and generalisable’ (2002: 23).
6 Flexibility
The meaning of flexibility
The principle of flexibility refers to the need, over the course of a burglary investigation, to
respond effectively to the emergence of any piece of information that can help to identify,
locate or apprehend a suspect. The need for flexibility goes hand-in-hand with a need for
rapidity, since the police response must usually be quick as well as flexible, if it is to have
any pay-off. The need for flexibility and rapidity follows from the fact that so much offending
is prolific: in other words, given the large numbers of offences that many burglars commit
over the course of days, weeks and months (note, for example, the rate of offending by
Steven L-, described in Box 3.1), it is crucial that the investigative process is primarily
concerned with halting offending behaviour as quickly as possible. There are dangers in
viewing the purpose of investigation as being simply to achieve an end result – that is, the
conviction of the offender – at some distant point in time.
This emphasis on flexibility follows from the recognition of investigation as a complex and
multi-layered process. If investigation was a straightforward, uni-linear process the activities
of the officers could more easily be planned and organised in advance. In reality, the
unpredictability and randomness of events are such that officers must be able to react
purposefully to the immediate demands of any set of circumstances, whatever the nature of
those demands and whenever and however they arise. 
The ability to respond flexibly and rapidly clearly depends not only on the motivation and
skills of the individual officer, but also on adequate resourcing. As a participant in one of
this study’s focus groups said:
It’s about having the resources available, and clearly if you have a burglary team
then you have a collective pool of officers that you can redivert from what they’re
doing to whatever the intelligence suggests you ought to do.
To acknowledge the importance of flexible and rapid police actions is not to question the
significance of routine. Rather, as has been suggested elsewhere in this report, the argument
here is that the effectiveness of burglary investigation is likely to be enhanced when it is
carried out within certain clear parameters. These parameters must nevertheless leave scope
for discretion in how officers deal with the immediacy of any given situation. Hence a
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balance must be struck between routine and flexibility, just as one must also be struck
between recognising the complexity of investigation and valuing simple police responses. 
The issue of flexibility has a bearing on almost all aspects of burglary investigation. It is to
be discussed in this chapter with regard to the following topics: first, the police response to
burglaries in progress; secondly, the importance of access to information; and, thirdly, the
randomness of burglary investigation.
Before moving on to these issues, however, it should be noted that in all three fieldwork sites
officers were evidently often frustrated when delays in systems beyond their control impeded
investigative work. Most notably, there were many concerns about the length of time it
typically took for fingerprint and DNA checks to be carried out by forensic services. When
a fingerprint or DNA trace was found at the scene of a burglary, it would usually take many
months for a match to be found if there was no named suspected to start with. If the suspect
was a prolific offender who was not apprehended by other means over this period, this kind
of delay could have a great cost: that is, the cost (of all kinds) associated with the
commission of a large number of offences. According to the research interviews with
officers, even the process of carrying out DNA or fingerprint checks against a named
suspect could sometimes take several weeks or even longer – unless the detectives involved
made strenuous efforts to speed up the process by pushing the forensic departments.
However, it was recognised also that lengthy delays could arise at the police end of the
process: that is, in the actioning of the results of forensic tests.
Delays in forensic work, combined with poor communication between departments,
sometimes resulted in target packages being produced long after the offender had been
charged and convicted for the offence in question, or had requested that it be TIC’d. Such
occurrences clearly amounted to an serious waste of valuable staff time. 
Burglaries in progress
There can be no clearer illustration of the importance of flexibility and rapidity than when the
police receive a report of a burglary that is in progress. An immediate response to such a report
is crucial, given that a significant number of primary burglary detections result from burglars
being caught in the act or very shortly thereafter. This point is not disputed by police forces; but
the work of Coupe and Griffiths (1996) suggests that improvements to the police response, in
terms of its rapidity and the numbers of officers involved, could increase the numbers of burglars
caught in the act. (They found, however, that other factors also determine the proportion of ‘in
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progress’ detections, including the behaviour of the offender and the characteristics of the local
environment.) As mentioned above, Coupe and Griffiths found that in 43 per cent of the
detected cases they studied the offender was arrested at or near the scene, but this represented
only 10 per cent of the burglaries reported as in progress. They also point out that the
apprehension of burglars in the act is a highly cost-effective method of detection26.
It should be noted that arriving quickly at the scene of a burglary reported as in progress can
prove rewarding even if the offender has by then made his escape – as there may be immediate
avenues of enquiry to be explored. The case presented in Box 6.1, below, provides a good
illustration of this: here, the offender was no longer at the scene of the burglary by the time the
first police officers arrived, but was shortly thereafter traced to a nearby bail hostel. This case
also illustrates the speed with which many offenders are able to dispose of their stolen goods:
by the time the officers had arrived at the bail hostel, 25 minutes after the burglary had been
committed, the offender had already got rid of the video recorder he had taken. Where
offenders act so quickly, speed and versatility in the police response can produce results. 
Box 6.1: Luck and skill in locating burglar Jim J-
In the summer of 2001 two DCs were on their way to visit a victim of a distraction burglary.
While driving through Senham they were informed, by the police control centre, of a
burglary in progress. The DCs made their way to the scene, and were the first to arrive. By
this time, however, the offender had made his escape with a stolen video recorder (VCR). 
The two DCs decided to visit some local bail hostels on the off-chance that the offender
might have been staying at one of these, and would therefore have brought the VCR
back there. At the second hostel they visited –at which they arrived 25 minutes after the
burglary had been committed – a member of staff said that a resident by the name of Jim
J– had just come in carrying a VCR. The hostel CCTV footage was checked by the police,
and indeed showed Jim bringing in what appeared to be a VCR, and handing it to
another resident. The latter’s room was searched, but there was no sign of the VCR, and
Jim and the other resident had left the hostel.
Jim was found by the police the following day and was arrested on suspicion of the
burglary, which he admitted. The VCR was recovered from a second-hand shop to which
Jim had taken it. He subsequently admitted to a further 22 burglaries, and is currently
serving a two-year sentence for burglary.
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26 A study by Blake and Coupe (2001) further explores the potential for arresting more burglars in the act.
The ACPO volume crime investigation manual observes that ‘where offenders have been
disturbed before completing an offence, they are likely to attempt another offence shortly
afterwards’ (2002: 18). This points to the importance of conducting thorough searches, by
whatever means possible, of the area in which the attempted offence took place. In
addition, all available information about the attempt – such as details of any suspects or
vehicles sighted – should be conveyed to other officers attending local crime scenes.
Access to information
As has been discussed and illustrated above, the process of investigating burglary is a
process of linking items of information about offences and items of information about
offenders. Given the vast numbers of offences and offenders that are dealt with by officers, it
is easy for crucial linkages to remain buried or to be overlooked. But when information that
connects certain individuals and certain events is gathered, recorded, and communicated
quickly, the chances are increased that these connections will come to light. It is equally
important that officers are proactive in seeking to retrieve relevant data from all available
sources, and not only those that are most obvious such as the main crimes or intelligence
databases. Rapid dissemination and retrieval of information ensures that officers have access
to the specific facts or intelligence they need over the course of an investigation, as and when
they need them. Conversely, due to the multitude of demands on the time and attention of
officers, valuable opportunities for detection may be lost if certain items of information
become available only after the relevant avenue of enquiry has been explored.
Hence early attendance at burglary scenes is important so that details of the offences can be
gathered, recorded and entered on to the relevant databases with minimum delay. In reality,
the availability of officers generally determines the speed with which the initial visit is carried
out: in Chiltern Vale, for example, officers said in interview that because of staff shortages
burglaries were sometimes attended two or three days after the event. Nevertheless, in this
area it was expected that the details taken during the initial visit would be entered on the
offences database within 24 hours of the report being taken27. In Oxford, efforts had been
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27 Ericson and Haggerty (1997), conducting research on Canadian police organisations, found that in some areas
laptops were used by officers ‘in the field’. These enabled the officers to transmit crime reports electronically as
soon as they had completed them at crime scenes – thereby ensuring that the information was almost immediately
made available to their colleagues. However, some problems were encountered in the implementation of this
system: for example, some of the officers were not computer literate, and some found the computers difficult to carry
and use, especially on foot patrol. In one police area studied by Ericson and Haggerty, a ‘voice-entry occurrence
report system’ was being introduced: that is, patrol officers were being issued with mobile telephones to call in their
crime reports to trained clerks. It was hoped that this would improve the quality of reports taken, and it could be
expected also to speed up the dissemination of information. At the time of the field-work undertaken for this study,
the introduction of a similar system for crime reporting was being considered in Thames Valley Police.
made to speed up the process by which initial crime reports made their way to the desks of
the relevant members of the burglary team, with the result that the officers generally received
the reports within one or two days of the initial visit to the scene. 
Access to information about offences is not solely a matter of burglary reports being entered
on to the crimes database, and the efficient allocation of cases to investigating officers. In
Oxford and the other fieldwork sites, officers did not simply wait to receive the completed
burglary pack for information about recent offences. If they needed to find out about any
very recent burglaries which had not yet been recorded by a uniformed officer – for
example, if a suspect arrested for another offence had property in his possession that was
believed to be stolen but could not be traced to a reported burglary – they would access the
command and control database to search the logs of calls from the public. (This reiterates
the importance of competent handling and recording of calls to the police, mentioned in
Chapter 4.) These were the circumstances under which Edward P- came to be charged with
burglary, as described below in Box 6.2.
In addition to the case of Edward P-, several other case studies examined for this project
provided examples of officers acting on very recent information in pressing charges for
burglary against suspects arrested for other offences. Sam P-, for example (Box 2.1), was
being questioned about one offence when property that had been found at his home
address was traced to another burglary that had been committed two days before. And
when Paul S- (Box 3.2) was arrested for breaching his bail conditions, he was found to have
property on his person that, it was quickly established, had come from a burglary carried
out earlier that day.
The case of Chris W. (Box 6.3) provides a different kind of example of how officers’ rapid
retrieval of information about offences can play a crucial part in an investigation. Here,
details obtained from the Police National Computer relating to a stolen vehicle helped to
link the target of an ongoing surveillance operation to a recent burglary.
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Box 6.2: Burglary of cash by Edward P-
In a suburb of Senham, at about 9.30 pm on 14 April 2001, a known burglar by the
name of Edward P- was seen acting suspiciously by two police officers on routine patrol.
They stopped to speak to him, and according to the witness statement of one of them, the
following exchange took place:
PC: Hello, Edward isn’t it?
EP: Yeah, there’s a load of money in there [in the holdall he was carrying] but I’ve
just got it for selling my motorbike.
PC: Oh right, how much is there then?
EP: Well, there’s got to be a hundred or so in one jar, er – 
PC: Edward P- I am arresting you on suspicion of burglary. [Caution.]
EP: But I just sold my motorbike.
The officers could see several jars of coins in Edward’s holdall, and found that the
pockets of his jeans were also crammed with coins. On their return to the station, the
officers searched the crime database for details of any recent burglary from which jars of
coins had been taken, but did not find any such offence listed. The next morning,
however, a search of the command and control records produced details of just such a
burglary committed between 6.30 pm and 11.05 pm the previous evening. 
Edward was interviewed about the offence on 15 April, and admitted to it. He was then
questioned about various other burglaries that had recently been carried out in the area,
which he denied. He was charged with the initial burglary, remanded in custody, and
subsequently admitted to 11 similar offences, which he asked to be TIC’d.
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Box 6.3: Surveillance operation against Chris W-
On 2 September 2001 the police in Tryton had been notified by the prison service that
Chris W-, a prolific burglar, had been released from prison. Shortly after Chris's release
the burglaries in an area of Tryton associated with him went up from 20 to 73 in a week. 
As the police strongly suspected that Chris was committing burglaries, a decision was
taken to launch a surveillance operation against him. On 19 September, the force
surveillance team followed him from his home address to a nearby hospital car park,
where he was seen to break into a car. Unfortunately for Chris, the car failed to start. He
was then followed to another car park, where he successfully stole a car. He drove this
vehicle to his home address, where he got into another vehicle that was parked there.
The police immediately ran Police National Computer checks on this third vehicle, and
discovered that it was flagged as having been reported stolen on 16 September.
Additionally, about 30 minutes after it had been stolen, an independent witness had
reported seeing it in the vicinity of a burglary.
Once the police had these details relating to the third car, they decided to arrest Chris on
the three vehicle offences: that is, two vehicle thefts and one attempted vehicle theft.
Uniformed officers were called in to make the arrest, which they did after Chris had
crashed the car he was driving and attempted to escape on foot. He was then charged
and remanded in custody. He was later arrested for the above burglary, and given
‘technical bail’ (as he was already in custody) pending the results of an examination of
forensic evidence found at the scene. At the time of the case study research, this
investigation was not complete.
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Randomness
In any burglary investigation, a seemingly chance or random event – for example, a
coincidental sighting of a possible suspect, or an arrest of a suspect in relation to an entirely
unrelated matter – might prove to be critical. If the police are able to respond quickly and
robustly to any such happy occurrence, thereby ‘making their own luck’ as many would
describe it, they may find that it produces a much-needed breakthrough. Osterburg and
Ward, writing about criminal investigation in general, describe ‘the unknown factor of
chance and the way experienced investigators can interpret and deliberately exploit it,
thereby opening up new knowledge and discovery’ (2000: 360).
In the case of Micky D- (Box 5.3), who was found with stolen property in his car after
being arrested for drink driving, the subsequent burglary charge can be said to have
originated in the observation by two uniformed officers on routine patrol that a vehicle
was being driven erratically. A combination of good fortune and sound reasoning (and
quick action) by detectives led to the arrest and ultimate conviction of Jim J- for
burglary, who (as described in Box 6.1) was found to have taken a stolen video
recorder to a bail hostel visited by the officers. Again, luck as well as good policing
played a part in the arrest of Edward P- on suspicion of burglary (see Box 6.2), which
resulted from his chance encounter with officers on night patrol shortly after he had
committed the offence.
In the case described in Box 6.4, below, two convictions for handling stolen goods came
about after the victim of a burglary happened to see his own car on the road nine days
after it had been taken by the burglar.
A certain randomness or unpredictability may characterise not only the different events
around which a burglary investigation is built, but also the reactions of suspects who have
been arrested or charged – particularly since many are likely to be struggling with drug
addictions, and to be leading chaotic lives. (This brings the discussion back to the ‘human
factor’ of investigative work, considered in Chapter 2) Officers should thus be sufficiently
ready and alert to take full advantage of the situation when a suspect indicates at any point
or in any way that he may be prepared to co-operate. For officers, this is partly a matter of
developing the kinds of ‘people skills’ that are often seen as crucial to being a good
detective. It is also a matter of being prepared to take immediate action in response to
anything helpful that is said by a suspect.
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Box 6.4: Vehicle burglar Ryan D-
A house in Senham was burgled on 22 March 2001 between the hours of 1.20 am and
7.45 am. Among other items, the burglar took the keys to the occupant’s car, and then
stole the vehicle which was parked at the front of the house.
At around 3 pm nine days later, the victim, Mr S-, was driving in a hire car along a main
road when he saw his own vehicle pull out in front of him, with a male driver and two
passengers (a female and a young child). Mr S- called the police from his mobile phone;
the police told him to keep following the car, and directed a mobile unit to the area.
Mr S- followed the stolen vehicle to a retail park, where it was parked and the occupants
got out. As they were heading towards one of the shops, the police arrived and spoke to
Mr S-, who pointed out the vehicle and driver. The officers arrested the driver on
suspicion of theft of motor vehicle; in reply to the caution he responded ‘I borrowed it off
a mate’. Officers spoke also to his female companion, who said that she had known him
only a few days, and was not detained. The keys to the vehicle were returned to Mr S-,
who then drove it home.
The suspect was 30-year-old Ryan D-, who was already known to the police and had
previous convictions for burglary, motor vehicle theft and other offences. His arrest in the
retail park led to his being charged with B.1 and a burglary of 28 March (B.2) from which
property had been taken that was found in Mr S-‘s vehicle. He was also charged with
three other recent burglaries on the basis of similar fact evidence (relating to his previous
convictions for burglary); however, these cases were later dropped. Ryan ultimately
pleaded guilty to handling charges with respect to B.1 and B.2, and on 3 October 2001
was sentenced to two terms of 18 months imprisonment, to be served concurrently.
The case of Sam P- (Box 2.1) provides an example of a detective successfully encouraging
and quickly building upon a suspect’s sudden inclination to co-operate with the police. After
denying three burglaries about which he had been questioned, Sam began to talk about his
severe addiction to crack cocaine when being fingerprinted by the (apparently
sympathetically-minded) detective, and indicated his willingness to admit to past offences in
an effort to obtain treatment for the addiction. At this point, the detective and a colleague
immediately took him on a ‘drive around’, during which he admitted to 18 burglaries.
However, he displayed what was described by the investigator as a certain ‘stubbornness’
in continuing to deny the offences about which he had originally been questioned –
including one at an address which he admitted to having burgled on a prior occasion.
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The interviews conducted with Micky D- (Box 5.3) also revealed a marked inconsistency or
unpredictability in the suspect’s responses. Micky initially denied all knowledge of the
burglary about which he was being questioned, and from which property had been found
in his car. Later, however, he admitted to knowing the victim of the offence, and claimed
that she had freely given him the property when he had visited her home. In the view of the
detective who dealt with the case, Micky was observing a kind of ‘code’ according to which
he would not make any direct admissions to the police; however, because he was finding it
difficult to cope with life on the outside after many years in prison, he consciously or
subconsciously wanted to be convicted for the offence and return to prison, and was
therefore ‘doing his best to help us [the police]’.
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7 Conclusions
Understanding investigation
This report presents a process perspective on the investigation of burglary. It is argued that
the investigation of burglary (and indeed of other volume crime) should be seen as a
complex and multi-layered process. Enquiries relating to one offence will most probably be
intertwined with investigations of several or many other offences – of the same or different
kinds. Additionally, it is likely that any one investigation will focus on the activities of several
suspects rather than a single individual. The focus of an investigation may, moreover, shift
between criminal activities that have occurred at different points in time and in different
places. In summary, it can be said that the complexity of the investigation of burglary
derives from the multiplicity of offences and multiplicity of offenders.
Given the high volume of burglary offences and levels of public concern about burglary,
and the low detection rate associated with this crime, there has long been a desire within
both the police and central government to increase the effectiveness of investigative work,
and to impose tighter management controls upon it. However, the recognition of the
complexity of the investigative process raises questions about how policy-makers and senior
police managers might best develop strategic models to guide working practices and
staffing structures for the investigation of burglary. It is clear that simplistic, step-by-step
characterisations of what investigation does, or ideally should, entail can be of little value to
the process of enhancing effectiveness.
If it is to be useful, a model of burglary investigation needs to be fluid and dynamic. Any
such model should, at its most basic level, present an understanding of the investigation of
burglary as a process of building:
a) networks of communication between individuals and agencies, linking:
b) items of information about individual offences; and
c) items of information about individual offenders.
The interconnectedness of proactive and reactive policing of burglary has been highlighted
in this report. Most burglary investigations, it appears, combine some elements of reactive
work – that is, work based on enquiries into individual offences – with elements of proactive
work – that is, the targeting of specific offenders through the use of intelligence and/or
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crime analysis. Indeed, proactive policing is often, in a sense, dependent on reactive work,
since the latter generally provides the leads and evidence that are used in detaining a
targeted offender. Good reactive work can, similarly, be said to be dependent on
proactivity, as the police may respond to individual incidents most thoroughly and effectively
when they are operating within a broad proactive framework.
Over the past two decades, policy-makers and senior police officers have placed ever-greater
weight on the importance of proactive policing – believing that greater commitment to
proactivity by operational police officers should produce improved detection rates. The
findings of this study suggest that – notwithstanding the evident value of much intelligence-led,
targeted policing – it is simplistic to assume that the proactive approach is inherently superior.
In the place of what has been a somewhat one-sided emphasis on proactivity, in recent
debate and guidance on policing policy, there should thus be wider recognition of the ways
in which proactive and reactive policing support and feed into each other. Previous research
has found that the move towards proactive policing has often been inhibited both by cultural
barriers within the police and by the fact that vast reactive workloads tend to distract officers
from proactive work. It is suggested here that an understanding of proactive and reactive
policing as complementary rather than competing should help to erode cultural resistance to
proactivity, and assist the development of mechanisms for integrating fully the two
approaches. This process may be aided by the implementation of the National Intelligence
Model in police forces across England and Wales, which provides a framework for the
integration of the use of intelligence within the broader policing enterprise.
Recommendations
The latter part of this report has identified and discussed three general principles for burglary
investigation: that is, the principles of routine, simplicity and flexibility. These principles emerge
out of an understanding of the investigative process as complex and multi-dimensional, and as
a process which, in most cases, encompasses elements of both proactive and reactive policing. 
Routine
To emphasise the importance of routine to the investigation of burglary at the same time as
highlighting the intrinsically complex and ‘messy’ nature of the investigative process may
seem slightly contradictory. In fact, the argument presented here is that precisely because
investigative work tends to have so many different, interlocking layers and dimensions, the
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adoption of systematic procedures with respect to certain elements of the process becomes
all the more important. 
 The activities that, as a minimum, must be carried out in the initial investigation of
a burglary should be clearly defined. These minimum requirements must be fully
communicated to all officers likely to be involved in the reporting and initial
investigation of burglaries. 
 Initial investigative work will be properly carried out only if the officers involved:
a) receive adequate training in the relevant procedures;
b) are allowed sufficient time to carry out the prescribed tasks in each case;
c) receive the support of managers in carrying out these duties; and
d) are subject to thorough supervision.
 The reporting of burglaries should not be treated as an isolated, largely
administrative task, but should be regarded as an integral and crucial part of the
wider process of disrupting criminals and preventing crime. 
 Systems for crime screening should be clear-cut and transparent, to ensure consistency
and accountability in the allocation of individual cases for further investigation.
 The crime screening process should entail a detailed assessment of the
characteristics of each case, and be implemented in the context of a general
awareness of patterns of offending in the local area, to ensure that possible links
between burglaries are noted and explored. 
 The use of dedicated officers to attend the scenes of burglaries should be
considered, as this allows information on different offences to be pooled and
reviewed at an early stage of the investigative process. This working
arrangement, however, may not be feasible in many contexts, given scarce
resources and the large volume of offences that are dealt with by officers. 
 Systems of verbal, written and electronic briefings should be in place to ensure a
constant flow of relevant information between officers involved – in all ways – in
the investigation of burglaries.
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 Information on offences, suspects and offenders must be routinely, promptly and
accurately entered on electronic databases that are user-friendly – that is,
physically accessible to officers (for example through networked computers) and
not overly complex. All officers should receive training on how to make maximum
use of the available databases.
 Individual officers should identify their information needs, as these relate to the specific
roles they play with respect to the investigation of burglary: that is, the information they
require to carry out their tasks most effectively, and their own capacity to acquire
information that may be of value to colleagues. A clear understanding of information
needs should help to avoid the potential problem of information overload.
 There is a need for systematic inter-agency communication about offenders and
suspects – for example, relating to prison releases, bail conditions imposed by courts,
and the discharge of suspects from bail hostels. Information of this kind received by the
police from other agencies must be promptly disseminated among relevant officers.
Simplicity 
Like routine, the principle of simplicity provides a striking counterbalance to the
conceptualisation of burglary investigation as a complex process. It is proposed that
investigative work can be most effective when police officers respond in relatively simple
ways to the complicated situations and chains of events on which their enquiries are focused.
In particular, given the lack of sophistication of most prolific burglars, in some circumstances
relatively basic and easy investigative actions (over and above those undertaken routinely as
part of an initial investigation) may prove rewarding. Simple responses to burglary should
nevertheless be informed: that is, they should be based on both specific and generalised
knowledge about the offences and offending behaviours that are being tackled. 
 As part of the crime screening process, with respect to each individual case it is
important to consider the possible utility of undertaking certain simple and quick
investigative actions (such as following up known routes of disposal of stolen
property) over and above the minimum required of every investigation.
 Informal communication, which allows information to be conveyed quickly, simply
and directly between officers, can play a vital part in investigative work. The
encouragement of informal information exchange – both within and between
police departments – should, however, occur within a context of properly
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implemented, formal briefings. Also, the importance of acting upon information
communicated informally must be recognised.
 If informal communication within a police force is to be optimised, certain
cultural changes may be required. Officers must come to regard information as
being of value only to the extent that it can be shared. In addition, effort should
be made to introduce working practices that can help to erode barriers
between different departments (such as CID and uniformed units) which tend to
hamper co-operation. 
 Informal communication and the associated cultural changes may be promoted
through alterations to the physical working arrangements of various police
departments. For example, locating particular departments in close proximity to
each other, keeping office doors open, and the sharing of office space, can play
a part in this.
 It should be recognised that simple methods of crime analysis undertaken by
police officers can be effective in the investigation of burglary – such as plotting
individual offences on a map, or manually recording details of recent offences in
a form that permits officers frequently to review the available information. 
 Notwithstanding the value of simple analytical tools and processes, the potential
value of more sophisticated methods of crime analysis should not be overlooked.
Simple analysis should be viewed as a process on which more complex analytical
work can build, as an investigation progresses. 
Flexibility
The principle of flexibility, which is closely related to that of rapidity, has a bearing on all aspects
of investigative work. As elaborated in the context of this report, this refers to the critical
importance of responding quickly and in an appropriate manner to any event or the emergence
of any piece of information that can help to identify, locate or apprehend a suspect. The emphasis
on flexibility follows from the recognition of investigation as a complex and multi-layered process.
Because an investigation can develop in any one or more of a number of different directions, at
any point in the process, it is vital that the officers involved have the capacity to focus and refocus
their attention on the critical issues, whenever and however they arise. Moreover, the randomness
and unpredictability of investigative work is such that a flexible and rapid response to a
seemingly chance happening can prove to be a pivotal moment in an investigation.
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 The resourcing of police units or departments involved in the investigation of
burglary should take fully into account the fact that successful investigation often
depends on the capacity of officers to respond immediately and flexibly to
random or unpredictable events.
 The importance of a rapid and flexible response to a burglary reported as in progress
should never be under-estimated, not only because this offers the opportunity of catching
the offender at the scene, but also because immediate avenues of enquiry may be
available even if the offender has made his escape prior to the arrival of the police.
 Early attendance at the scene of a burglary (not reported as in progress) is often
vital, as is rapid dissemination of information about the offence. Hence
information acquired by the reporting officer must be inputted on the relevant
database as soon as possible, and the file quickly passed on to officers
responsible for any further investigative work. As well as ensuring that the
investigation of the individual offence maintains its momentum, this kind of prompt
action should help any links with other recent offences to be identified.
 In dealing with suspects who have been arrested, officers need to be aware of any
recent crimes with which they may be connected. Officers should thus be ready and
able to access up-to-date information from any available source (for example, crime
and control logs of calls from the public) about recent offences or other occurrences.
 Suspects who are being interviewed by the police may react in unexpected or
highly inconsistent ways to questioning. It is therefore important that officers have
the necessary skills, motivation and time to act immediately in response to any
apparent indication by a suspect that he is prepared to co-operate with the police.
 Lengthy delays in conducting tests on forensic evidence found at burglary scenes can
result in lost opportunities for apprehending active and prolific offenders. Thought must
therefore be given to the ways in which officers may be able to work around or
minimise these delays (for example, by making direct requests to laboratories for
preliminary test results). Communication between the police and forensic departments
should be improved, so as to avoid unnecessary work being carried out on forensic
materials, for example, when a suspect has already admitted to the offence in question. 
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Appendix A The fieldwork sites
Oxford
Oxford Police Area is situated within the Thames Valley Police Force. The Oxford police are
responsible for policing the city and those suburbs which lie within the surrounding
ringroad. About 400 staff (including about 75 civilians) work at the area's two police
stations. According to the 1991 census, which excluded much of the student population, the
city has a population of approximately 110,000. Including students, the population is
estimated by Oxford City Council to be about 145,000. 
Both uniformed officers and the members of a dedicated burglary team are involved in the
investigation of burglaries in Oxford. The initial visit to a burglary scene is usually undertaken
by uniformed officers, who enter details of the offence, including modus operandi (MO), in
the crime report form. They will also conduct house-to-house enquiries and complete a
schedule of stolen property. A statement from the aggrieved is not taken at this stage unless a
suspect was seen or a suspicious vehicle sighted. Scenes of crime officers (SOCOs) are then
routinely requested to attend the scene, in order to conduct a forensic examination. 
The crime report is forwarded by the reporting officer directly to the burglary team, which
comprises a sergeant and eight (detective and police) constables who have responsibility for
different areas of the city. The team sergeant reviews the report and notes key points, and
details are entered on to the offences database by the team’s administrator or the crime desk.
The report is then allocated to the officer in the team who has geographic responsibility for
the area in which the burglary occurred. On receiving the report, the burglary team officer
reviews it, records key points in his personal record book, and conducts further investigation
as deemed necessary. This might include re-visiting the scene, looking for connections with
other offences, and identifying and interviewing possible suspects. 
Chiltern Vale
Chiltern Vale is a diverse police area located, like Oxford, within the Thames Valley police
force. It encompasses a number of urban centres including High Wycombe and Amersham
as well as the surrounding areas of farmland and villages. The population of the area is a
little under 300,000. About 280 police officers and 70 civilian staff work in the eight
stations located within Chiltern Vale. (The considerably higher ratio of local residents to
police officers in Chiltern Vale as compared to Oxford is largely due to the higher crime rate
in Oxford and the large number of visitors to the city.) 
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As in Oxford, the initial police response to burglary is generally attendance at the scene by a
uniformed officer, who completes the standard crime report form – a copy of which is then
forwarded to the crime desk so that details can be entered on to the offences database. In
addition to compiling the crime report, the reporting officer should take a statement from the
aggrieved and any witnesses, complete the schedule of stolen property, carry out house-to-
house enquiries, determine whether a SOCO visit is required, and receive the SOCO report. 
On completion of the initial investigation, the ‘burglary pack’ containing the report and
additional items (such as the stolen property schedule) is checked by the local area
sergeant, and by an officer appointed by Chiltern Vale specifically to ‘audit’ such packs. If
there are indications of a possible suspect, or a vehicle has been sighted, the file will usually
then go to the Chiltern Vale burglary team, which comprises a sergeant and seven detective
constables, for further investigation. In the absence of any leads, a pack will be filed
pending the emergence of further information. 
Coventry
Coventry is situated within West Midlands Police. The force is divided into 21 operational
command units (OCUs), of which one, known as the M1 OCU, encompasses most of
Coventry. This OCU is made up of four sectors which cover the city centre and three
outlying areas of the city. The area has a population of approximately 140,000. Just under
400 staff, of whom almost 300 are police officers, work at the OCU’s two police stations.  
The initial investigation of burglary in Coventry is broadly similar to that in Oxford and
Chiltern Vale. A burglary is initially attended by a uniformed officer who compiles the crime
report, conducts house-to-house enquiries and completes the schedule of stolen property. A
witness statement is not taken from the aggrieved at this stage, unless a suspect or vehicle
was seen. SOCOs are almost invariably requested to attend domestic burglaries. The crime
report is inputted into the offences database by the crime handling centre within 24 hours of
initial scene attendance.
Unlike Oxford and Chiltern Vale, Coventry does not have a burglary team. Hence, when the
initial investigation is complete, the report is passed to the detective assigned to the relevant
sector or, if he is not available, to a member of Coventry police’s ‘core CID’. The detective
who receives the report carries out further enquiries if these seem appropriate – for
example, if there has been a witness description, a vehicle sighting, or the use of a stolen
credit card. In the absence of any evidence from the scene or elsewhere, the case is filed.
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Appendix B Fieldwork activities
Case study reviews
The review of case files was the primary component of the research reported here. Officers
in each site were asked to identify recent burglary investigations in which they had been
involved, and around ten cases were identified in this way in each site. Paperwork relating
to each of these cases, including burglary reports and case summaries, were examined by
the researchers; and interviews with the officer in the case (OIC) – usually a detective
constable – were conducted in order to gain a personal account of the relevant events.  
The cases were diverse: some involved the investigation of a single burglary; others involved
analysing local series of offences; a few involved surveillance work; most were cleared up
but some went unsolved. Taken as a whole, therefore, they provided insight into a wide
range of police activities associated with the investigation of burglary. The selection of the
cases by the officers themselves (rather than through some form of systematic or random
sampling process) was consistent with the qualitative, exploratory nature of the research.
Fourteen of the cases reviewed for this study are used over the course of this report to
exemplify the points raised. All these cases have been fully anonymised.
Focus groups
Between February and July 2001 nine focus groups took place across the three fieldwork
sites. Participants in the groups included uniformed officers, CID officers and SOCOs of
various ranks. The aim of the focus groups was to explore the investigative methods adopted
in relation to burglary in each of the research sites, and to identify what the officers
perceived to be the stronger and weaker aspects of the process.
Two further focus groups were held at South Bank University at the conclusion of the
fieldwork. These groups involved officers of constable to chief inspector rank from the three
research sites, representing intelligence units, uniformed staff and CID. These groups were
held in order to obtain feedback on the research team’s preliminary conclusions.
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Semi-structured interviews
In addition to the interviews conducted with each OIC from the case studies, the researchers
carried out 24 semi-structured interviews with police personnel from a range of ranks and
departments in the three sites. Respondents included intelligence officers, SOCOs, burglary
team sergeants and crime analysts. Like the focus groups conducted at the three sites, the
interviews focused on the general processes of burglary investigation adopted in each area,
and the apparent strengths and weaknesses of investigative work. 
Observational exercises
In order to gain further insight into the day-to-day work of officers, two of the researchers
spent five days observing the activities of the Oxford burglary team, and ‘shadowed’
officers engaged in the reporting of burglaries in Oxford and Chiltern Vale. 
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